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Abstract 
 
This master thesis examines professorial recruitment at the University of Vienna from the 
perspective of the Department of Economic and Social History.  Starting point and theoretical 
assumption is based on the concept of living autonomy. This concept states that university 
autonomy effects cannot be understood by focusing solely on formal reform aspects and thus 
confronts them with de facto, ‘living’, autonomy. Living autonomy emphasises the 
importance of the working floor of the university and their interpretation of autonomy. The 
research question of the master thesis is how practices of institutional autonomy concerning 
the recruitment of professors change in the backdrop of the latest university reforms in 
Austria.  In order to answer this question a document review of policy papers was made in 
combination with key expert interviews at different levels of the university. The study reveals 
that departmental influence still provides substantial input on the recruitment process and that 
university reforms have constrained the input of the working floor with regards to professorial 
recruitment only to a limited extent. However, by strengthening the executive structure, a 
coherent university strategy in terms of quality- and international-oriented appointment policy 
became possible which stands in contrast to former recruitment practices.  
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1 REFORMING GOVERNANCE AND 
PERSONNEL POLICIES IN THE 
UNIVERSITY 
 
This chapter will present the introduction to our topic and elaborates what we are going to 
deal with in this thesis. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section is going to 
give us information on the context of our thesis. It will lead stepwise to our actual research 
problem, from university reforms and personnel policies in general, to university reforms and 
personnel policies in Austria specifically, always with emphasis on the professorial 
recruitment. The second section will tie on the research problem by proposing research 
question and presenting our case. The third section is going to point out the relevance of the 
master thesis. The fourth section will round off this chapter by presenting an overview of the 
thesis structure. 
 
1.1 The impact of reforms on university personnel 
policies 
1.1.1 Personnel policies1 and recruitment  in academia 
Personnel policies and recruitment in academia is structured and defined by the unique 
character of academic work and the related profession, and thus follows its own patterns. In 
order to understand recruitment in this field, one has to take the special nature of academic 
work and academic profession into account.  
The remarkable feature about academic work is that its intrinsic nature is very specific. 
Various studies on higher education and academic activities came to the conclusion that 
academic work is more of an intellectual craft (Musselin 2006) dependent on unclear 
                                                 
1 There are different labels describing matters related to personnel/staff (human resource management, personnel 
affairs, etc.) In order to avoid definition problems, we will only use ‘Personnel Policies’ unless mentioned 
differently. 
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technologies (Cohen et al. 1972) and hence difficult to describe, categorise and reproduce. 
(Musselin 2006) This holds especially true when looking at the core profession within higher 
education, namely the professorate2. Undoubtedly, the rank of a professor plays a central role 
in academia. Professorial status and related privileges are the desired destination of an often 
long and stony academic career, and eventually being appointed as professor is the highest 
appreciation one can get from the scientific community and the academic reward system. 
(Enders 2006) 
In former times - and in a stylised way - the academic profession and its recruitment and 
appointment logics, as mentioned above, were characterised by a high level of self-
management and self-control in Europe, dependent on reward and respect by the peers. These 
control mechanisms led to a system that was quite disconnected from markets and therefore 
prevented the emergence of an institutional level. One of the common statements is that 
professional control nowadays is becoming weaker while institutional control appears to be 
stronger. Still, with regards to reproduction configurations in terms of access to the 
profession, recruitment and career stages, professional control further on plays an important 
role. The informal evaluation through peers plays a decisive role in excluding or including 
colleagues and granting them access to academia. (Musselin 2009) 
However, while self-evaluation and reward mechanisms through peers and the academic 
community still are a main factor in academic labour markets and thus in recruitment 
processes, new forms of regulation and non-academic standards are becoming increasingly 
important. With changing conditions through university reforms, one can not solely observe 
the nature of academic work but also has to take the institutional/organisational dimension of 
the university into consideration when looking at the reproduction logics of academic 
recruitment. (Musselin 2008) 
Independently, we have to be aware that those categorisations and descriptions are always 
snapshots in time, and that academic work and profession as well as academic labour market 
and recruitment processes are always in a state of flux. The important question is to which 
extent change is happening and what the reasons and main drivers behind this change are. In 
                                                 
2 National higher education systems and immanent career structures and posts can vary widely according to 
rights and duties and the definition of a position. In this thesis the term ‘professor’ usually refers to the rank of a 
full professor. 
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this respect let us take a look in the next paragraph on recent reform trends and what the 
impacts on personnel policies and eventually academic recruitment are.  
 
1.1.2 University reforms - university governance and personnel 
policies on trial 
Various studies on higher education conclude that universities are in a state of dramatic 
change against the backdrop of their long history. (see e.g. Enders 2006; Gornitzka et al. 
2007; Amaral 2008) Especially in Europe, despite national characteristics, the continental 
European model of the university is undergoing major changes in recent decades due to 
various environmental forces. Phenomena like financial constraints, diversity and 
massification of higher education systems, accountability, and market mechanisms (Enders 
2006) have a distinct impact on the academic profession and how the university is organised 
nowadays. Gornitzka et al. (2007) e.g. concluded that a new pact between university and 
society is needed. A popular argument is that universities are not adapting and responding 
flexible and fast enough to social changes and needs. It is important that universities are well 
integrated into society and match societal and economical demands. This attitude corresponds 
to new expectations that politics, economy and eventually society have, and which are 
translated into new forms of governance within universities. In order to be competitive, 
European universities have to improve, which means that new ways of organisation are 
needed. A solution is seen in more autonomy for universities and - at a first glance - less 
governmental interference since universities know best what is needed in order to fulfil their 
mission. (Maassen & Olsen 2007) In this respect, a general definition of university autonomy 
is made by Berdahl (1990) who distinguishes between substantive and procedural autonomy:  
“Substantive autonomy is the power of the university or college in its corporate from 
to determine its own goals and programmes - if you will, the what of academe. 
Procedural autonomy is the power of the university or college in its corporate form to 
determine the means by which its goals and programmes will be pursued - the how of 
academe.” (Berdahl 1990: 172) 
As a consequence a new layer in European university governance is emerging in terms of 
gaining more power, namely the institutional management. According to Maassen (2008), one 
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of the central issues in modernising the university is the “[p]rofessionalisation of institutional 
leadership and management, and the subsequent adaptation of the institutional governance 
structures.” (Maassen 2008: 100) This issue becomes especially important due to the fact that 
one distinct characteristic of the European university in terms of authority and university 
governance - especially in contrast to the US model - has been a model of weak autonomous 
levels of university/faculties, with dean and rector acting as primus inter pares, and a distant 
ministry. In other words, in personnel policies for example, senior professors at the lower 
level usually have negotiated directly with state officials at the higher level and have skipped 
the institutional level of the university. Thus, this procedure has kept down the rise of an 
institutional administration and prevented the uprise of a level between basic scientific units/ 
academic oligarchy and the government. (Clark 1983) One central idea of strengthening the 
institutional level, i.e. withdrawal of (direct) state influence and raise of institutional 
autonomy at the university, is that universities should now acquire more strategic control over 
human resources. (Maassen & Olsen 2007) They should be able to act unified and not 
fragmented, especially when dealing with important internal and future-oriented matters like 
personnel policies.  
But how are impacts of reform attempts on personnel policies occurring especially with 
respect to a growing importance of the institutional level of the university? More institutional 
autonomy in personnel policies and management has led to different outcomes in different 
countries (Maassen 2008). Let us therefore take a closer look on the characteristics of 
changing personnel policies and academic recruitments in some European countries in order 
to identify common patterns and to classify our case. 
Characterising changing personnel policies and recruitment  
Although certain tendencies of convergences and attempts of unification of higher education 
systems and universities in Europe occur e.g. like in the Bologna process, reforms always 
include distinct national patterns. This holds especially true for academic labour markets and 
their immanent mechanisms of recruitment processes which are strongly characterised by 
their national policies and system patterns. (Musselin 2005)  
A comparative study on higher education reforms in Western European countries (Paradeise 
et al. 2009) could observe the following outcomes in the field of personnel policies and 
recruitment practices:  reforms and developments in the recent decades have shown an overall 
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tendency from professional bureaucracy to public organisations (which now have to act and 
be accountable) but with different national outcomes and characteristics. The outcomes in the 
field of recruitment processes (here with a special focus on professorial recruitment) comprise 
the development from the 1980s until 2000s, and were in general as follows: 
In France, the formal creation and regulation of academic positions was in the hands of the 
ministry. The selection and hiring process was conducted and approved by elected academic 
bodies based on disciplinary authority.  An important change has been the growing 
importance of central leadership and university bodies which make recommendations to the 
ministry, and also have limited power in creating positions on their own, despite the fact that 
they play central roles in employment and recruitment processes. In Germany, university 
faculties had the right of self-recruitment and to set up commissions for the recruitment. 
Approval was made by the state ministry. Internal appointments were usually forbidden. In 
the recent decades there has been some formal shift to the institutional level (management, 
leadership, boards of trustees) which has gained influence in the recruitment process of 
professors. In some states an approval by the ministry has become obsolete. In Italy, requests 
on positions were established by the faculty and sent via the rector to the ministry. The system 
was characterised by a strong influence of full professors. Change occurs in the creation of 
positions according to development plans which are approved by the ministry. A number of 
new positions are fixed in negotiations between rector and university senate. Hiring is made 
by the rector, based on propositions form the faculty; full professors and disciplines still play 
a central role. In the Netherlands, full professors were formally appointed by the crown. The 
number of positions was based according to student numbers which was funded by the 
government. The recent years are characterised by the fact that now the university decides on 
positions regarding budget but with the possibility to delegate this decision to the faculty.  In 
Norway, the ministry had formal decision power; recruitment and new positions were 
assigned to the particulars institutions, and here usually in the hands of disciplinary units. 
Recruitment is now dependent on faculty funds; these are allocated within faculty based on 
demand formulas. Disciplinary commissions send suggestions; the institute board makes 
formal decisions when dealing with full professor recruitment. In Switzerland, the responsible 
canton or the federal government recruited full professors suggested by academic 
commissions. There has not been an overall change, except from some universities which 
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received more autonomy and now are able to appoint all their staff. In the UK3, the 
recruitment procedure has not changed significantly. The particular university creates faculty 
positions. Decisions on recruitment are then made by senior panel members of the university 
who receive advice from external senior academics. (Paradeise et al. 2009: 270-272) 
In summary it can be said that especially in matters of personnel policies an authority shift in 
terms of hiring processes and decision making towards the university as organisation has been 
observable in the light of these reforms. At least in formal terms, the influence of the 
academic profession has been pushed back in favour of an emerging executive structure and 
central leadership. (ibid) For our case it will be of interest how the Austrian higher education 
system and especially the Austrian university corresponds to these Europeans developments 
and where to locate it in the bigger picture. As a result, the next paragraph will take a brief 
look on the Austrian way of transition including relevant university reforms. 
 
1.1.3 University reforms in Austria - university governance and 
personnel policies on trial 
University governance in the time before the Universities Act 2002 
The Humboldtian model was established at Austrian universities in the 19th century. In terms 
of governance structures, universities at that time were  
“characterised by a dualism between political and academic authority: with respect to 
all aspects of public interest, the university was a state agency and subject to 
centralised decision making by legislation and state bureaucracy; all issues regarding 
teaching and research were in the hands of the academic oligarchy - each chair 
holder being in charge of his/her own specialised field of research.” (Pechar 2005: 
para. 1) 
Internal governance structures were also subject to this dualism (academic staff  
administrative staff) each following their own leadership structures. But academic hierarchy 
was less marked; rector, dean and head of department were rather representative than 
                                                 
3 According to various studies and literature in higher education, the university model of the UK displays an own 
model besides the US university and (Continental) European university model. (see e.g. Clark 1983) 
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executive in terms of academic leadership. The true power lay within the chairs as being the 
unit where research and teaching was concentrated. The professor was the authority in his/her 
field and in questions of academic expertise placed over non-academic staff and junior 
academics. With regards to the organisational structure within the university, professors and 
state bureaucracy were often negotiating directly. University management as such was less 
developed and rather symbolic. Paired with civil servant status including lifelong tenure, this 
system produced a relatively free, autonomous and strong academic oligarchy defining 
academic freedom on the one side and a state which is protecting this system on the other 
side. (Pechar 2005) 
The beginning 1960s are characterised by a paradigmatic shift. State as well as society began 
to expand their influence in university matters. Universities were increasingly perceived as 
contributing to the economic growth of the country, and new policies were recommending to 
develop human capital and to raise student numbers. As a consequence the higher education 
system and the universities were modernised. The rising student numbers were followed by 
growing staff numbers who were assigned to teaching and not solely to assist the chair. As a 
consequence of this increasing independence, the non-professorial teaching staff (Mittelbau) 
demanded appropriate representation. This lead to internal power struggles between them and 
full professors, who opposed this development. The government had to intervene also with 
regards to securing the new economic importance of universities. The University Organisation 
Act 1975 (UOG 1975) was “[a] fundamental reform of governance and the internal 
organisation of universities” (Pechar 2005: para. 2) which strengthened the position of the 
non-professorial teaching staff and by beginning to replace the chair structure by an institute 
structure4. (ibid) 
The reform of the UOG 1975 was basically aiming at transforming a university towards a 
democratic university. The professorial university (Ordinarienuniversität) - oligarchically 
organised and based on the Humboldtian model - turned into a university of committees 
including commissions, conferences, curiae and parities. In this university model, applications 
                                                 
4 In a chair system (in Austria called Ordinarienuniversität) power is in the hand of (few) full professors who 
govern the university. Junior faculty is dependent and assigned to the particular full professor, research and 
teaching organised around the chair. The institute system actually comprises several chairs and thus is the basic 
organisational level. In this system junior faculty is not as dependent as in the chair system. It obtained a new 
status with the UOG 1795 and hence represented a new group of academics at the Austrian universities (non-
professorial staff, in German Mittelbau). (Pechar 2005) The Institute is actually representing the department/the 
departmental level. 
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from the university were still approved by the ministry who had decisional authority in 
personnel and budgetary matters. (Winckler 2003) 
After a time of low pressure in higher education policies, the end of the 1980s was 
characterised by a change that questioned the traditional steering mechanisms between state 
and universities and thus went beyond the internal regulations of the universities. The 
complexity of the Austrian higher education system questioned the appropriateness of the way 
of steering universities centrally with the ministry having the final say. Ministerial distance 
and state bureaucracy were dealing not sufficiently with university matters, an argument 
which finally forced key actors to reassess steering models in higher education. Despite that, 
cuts in public spending led to tensions between state actors and the higher education 
community. From a political and administrative perspective, a solution here was seen in 
increased university autonomy.  (Pechar 2005)  
The University Organisation Act 1993 (UOG 1993) was confronted with a number of 
problems during the implementation phase and had to be revised several times before being 
accepted finally. From the professorial perspective, autonomy should rely on academic 
freedom in the Humboldtian sense, and (re-)strengthen the professorial position in contrast to 
non-professorial staff and state. Students and non-professorial staff favoured the 
collegial/democratic model with governance and participation structures in the university 
through collegial bodies. The ministry perceived autonomy as institutional autonomy with 
university self-governance and management structures. The ministerial approach was resisted 
heavily in the following time. Students and junior faculty feared a strong academic leadership 
and therefore the redemption of achievements concerning democratic participation which 
were granted by the UOG 1975. Professors feared that managerial structures would endanger 
traditional forms of academic self-organisation. Until the UOG 1993 came into play in the 
mid/end 1990s it was weakened several times during its formulation phase. Still, it opened the 
gateway for reforms with regards to institutional autonomy as we will see in the Universities 
Act 2002 (UG 2002). (ibid) 
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University governance and personnel policies in the light of the Universities 
Act 2002 and the Amendment 2009 
Although the path of the UOG 1993 eventually led to the UG 2002, this law is not perceived 
as a legal continuation but rather equated as a caesura in Austrian university history. The 
university laws UG 2002 and the Amendment 2009 (UG 2009) are described as the beginning 
of a new era or as a cultural change which clears off the remaining legal structures of the 
previous university laws. (Novak 2009) 
The UOG 1993 has lead to the emergence of new and more powerful actors in the university: 
rectors and deans gained power and influence within the university and are beginning to 
become important actors between the traditional academic oligarchy and the ministry. This 
type of ‘new’ leadership had to take both internal (university) as external (society/ministry) 
perspectives into account. The reforms attempts which eventually led to the UG 2002 were no 
longer carried out only by the government but also partly supported by powerful actors within 
academia. (Pechar 2005) 
The basic idea behind the new act was to grant “autonomous status for universities while 
preserving state-ownership” (Neuhäuser 2004: 20). To manage this approach, a new way in 
terms of organisational autonomy was searched for. This was e.g. especially relevant for the 
funding mechanisms. Universities in Austria were and still are mainly public funded. But 
general tasks and objectives of universities are not subject to ministerial orders any longer. 
The UG 2002 introduced performance agreements between the state/ministry and the 
particular university. Public funds are now granted based on agreed achievements. These 
funds constitute around 80-90 % of a university budget. Aim was to reward and steer a 
university output-oriented, while the university has the autonomy in input-orientation. Only 
the highest level is determined (university board, senate, rectorate); the organisational 
structure of each university follows the custom organisational plan (which is proposed by the 
rectorate, discussed by the Senate, and approved by the university board). The development 
plan constitutes the scientific profile of the university. (Winckler 2003) 
The UG 2009 builds on the UG 2002 and continues the intention of restructuring the relation 
between state and universities in terms of organisational autonomy. For the moment, this 
adjustment is seen as the last step of this comprehensive reform process. Flexible internal 
organisation, monocratic decision structures, and performance orientation are continued and 
enlarged. In general, direct state control has been replaced by new mechanisms, like 
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transparency, accountability, performance and demand orientation, output related steering and 
efficiency. (Novak 2009) 
These effects are displayed by a continuous disentanglement of important university issues 
like personnel policies where the university is supposed to gain more influence and act 
independently from direct ministerial intervention. (Novak 2009) For example, one feature of 
this development which will confront us regularly in the course of the thesis is the fact that 
personnel policies and management are now in the hands of the university which is an 
important change for the organisational autonomy of the university. (see e.g. Pechar 2004 and 
Gantner 2013) For our case it will be important to see other impacts of the reforms with 
regards to personnel policies and especially professorial recruitment. Let us therefore point 
out some general characteristics of changing personnel policies at the Austrian university in 
the next paragraph in order to narrow down our field of interest.  
Change in personnel policies and recruitment in Austrian universities 
The tendency in the employment situation has been decentralisation, i.e. a shift from the 
ministry to the lower levels of authority in higher education. Strengthening the institutional 
side in personnel policies has become a major issue at European universities as well as in 
Austria, and is a great challenge for academic management. (Enders & de Weert 2004) 
A study of the Centre for Higher Education (CHE) from 2010 on career promotion in 
European academic management assesses European universities high autonomy in personnel 
policies, i.e. selection and recruitment. The same applies to Austria, where autonomy in 
personnel policies is rated high (both concerning academics and administrators) and only 
slightly below European average. (Nickel & Ziegele 2010: 148-157) The European University 
Association (EUA) assesses and categorises university autonomy in European countries 
according to organisational, financial, staffing and academic autonomy. In Austria, autonomy 
in personnel policies is classified as medium high, and slightly above average when compared 
to other European countries. Relevant factors in personnel autonomy are recruitment 
procedure, salaries, dismissal, and promotion procedure both for academics and 
administrative staff. Austria is being assessed to have high recruitment procedure autonomy, 
above average salary autonomy, below average dismissal autonomy, and high promotion 
procedure autonomy. (Estermann et al. 2011: 38-44) Although these studies and rankings are 
an interesting starting point, they are of limited use for the thesis since they only display the 
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institutional dimension of autonomy but very limited the underlying and internal university 
dynamics that might lead to such results.  
The important issue here for us is that the UG 2002 provided the possibility for universities to 
choose their own organisational setup. Thus, the organisational autonomy of the university 
has led also to autonomy in personnel policies i.e. that universities are now directly 
responsible for their staff. A new feature in this respect is the new employment situation; staff 
is now employed directly by the university and does not have civil servant status any longer. 
As a consequence of the governance power shift from ministry to university, management 
styles in steering based on New Public Management become more important. A fear of 
traditional academics and basic academic units is that the institutional management comes 
nearer now, and as a consequence impacts their work to a greater extent than a distant 
ministry e.g. in personnel policies. The new principals in general are now the rector/vice 
rector and the deans, dependant on the organisational layout of each Austrian university. They 
work as connecting link between ministry and basic academic units with regards to 
performance agreements. (Pechar 2010) 
Legal settings, organisational autonomy and layout, strengthened leadership and the rise of 
the managerial class undoubtedly play a major role in the restructuring process of universities 
and personnel policies but how does this e.g. affect the recruitment of professors especially in 
interaction with the traditional academic oligarchy?  
Professorial recruitment  
National characteristics play a central role in how the profession of the professor is shaped. 
Enders (2006) e.g. stresses the fact that although international trends seem to lead to common 
global patterns of the academic profession, national responses will make an major input on 
how these patterns will eventually occur in the national systems. In addition, as pointed out 
before, national characteristics and the university models (in our case the Continental 
European model) clearly seem to play an important role in the recruitment process. 
Personnel policies in Austria are in the hands of the university. Of interest are the possible 
implications for the recruitment of professors. To give an example: the formal dimension of 
the professorial recruitment is e.g. displayed by the Professorial Appointment Procedure of 
the University of Vienna. This process is characterised by different phases and stages and 
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follows certain rules, and is clearly an interesting topic of its own. But our focus has to go 
beyond these formalities and has to examine the informal inputs or the influence of the 
department at different stages of the recruitment process. Thus, both perspectives have to be 
analysed together.   
We have now come to the core topic of our research and have localised it as far as possible. 
Let us therefore proceed to the next paragraph and propose our research question in order to 
see what we are dealing with in this thesis.  
 
1.2 Research question and case 
1.2.1 Research question 
Taking the underlying assumptions i.e. findings from other European countries into account, 
the important question for us - when looking specifically at professorial recruitment - is 
actually: what happens when new executive structure and academic oligarchy rooted in 
disciplines meet in the recruitment process of professors in the backdrop of changing 
university frameworks? In other words and more generally, the thesis wants to explore: 
HOW ARE PRACTICES OF INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY CHANGING 
CONCERNING THE RECRUITMENT OF PROFESSORS? 
In order to answer our overall question and to satisfy our research interest, the following two 
sub-questions are going to be raised: 
• What has changed formally in the recruitment process of professors? 
• What has changed informally in the recruitment process of professors? 
Taking the preceded arguments and findings into account, the following considerations for 
our research question are given: the field of academic management and personnel policies is 
characterised by new challenges when it comes to university reforms. (Enders & de Weerts 
2009) The important question is: who may enter how? According to different studies (e.g. 
Amaral 2008; Maassen 2008; Krücken & Meier 2006) universities are confronted with an 
emerging executive and hierarchical structure which also affects different university areas like 
13 
 
personnel policies and the professorial recruitment. However, universities are also bottom-
heavy institutions (Clark 1983) robust and resilient to (external) change (Olsen 2007) and 
therefore frame, embed and constrain university processes. Studies in other countries have 
pointed out that academics and in special full professors still play an important role when 
looking at their influence on the recruitment process of new professors. (Musselin 2005)  
So how is this phenomenon occurring at Austrian universities? Various authors stress the fact 
that the institutional dimension is becoming more and more important with the fear that 
executive structures are or will become too powerful with regards to academic freedom. (e.g. 
Neuhäuser 2004 and Novak 2009) However, it seems that those perspectives are too focused 
on legal impacts and hence might overrate the influence of legal changes, without looking at 
the interpretative power or the (new) room to manoeuvre of the different actors inside 
academia.  
The UG 2002 in Austria is still debated intensively especially with regards to the situation of 
the University of Vienna. From a general point of view this might have two reasons. First, the 
University of Vienna is an old and prestigious university, by far the biggest one in Austria 
comprising a very traditional environment, and thus of national importance. Secondly, the UG 
2002 in Austria has been assessed as quite radical in comparison to other European university 
reforms. (Pechar 2010) An executive structure, feared and perceived as exceptional strong 
would limit professorial and departmental influence on the recruitment process severely. 
On the other side, resistance from the academic community is almost a natural reaction to 
reforms. (Amaral 2008) Hence, the inner life of departments is preserved and protected by 
being quite resilient and robust to change (Olsen 2007). Although personnel policies and 
professorial recruitment are facing constantly new constraints, Musselin (2005) has also 
shown in her cases that - although it would be legally possible - leadership seldom questioned 
department decisions in hiring processes. (ibid: 146; 152) The university is a bottom-heavy 
institution and central executive structure is (still) dependent on influence and opinions of the 
academic oligarchy/the department who give important input from the bottom. (Pechar 2004) 
1.2.2 Case 
The reason for making this study was given by the considerations of the FLAGSHIP project 
of the HEIK research group at the University of Oslo. The project wants to research how old 
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and prestigious universities in small Western European countries respond to recent reforms 
and a changing environment. The underlying assumption is that although several reform 
attempts have been made, the effect on daily and internal response-related operations has so 
far brought little evidence-based knowledge on these changes. (Fumasoli et al. 2012) Despite 
that, due to the complexity of higher education systems and universities in particular, 
including various actors and stakeholders, research on this topic has to be carried out on 
different levels and in different fields of the university.  
One part of the project that receives special attention is the departmental level and how this 
organisational level responds to the mentioned changes. In this thesis departmental level 
refers basically to the departmental leadership and the academics in the department. This 
approach was seen as appropriate for the scope of a master thesis. From this initial point, 
further consideration could be made and connected to the field of personnel policies and how 
changes would eventually occur against the backdrop of university reforms. Limiting 
personnel policies to professorial recruitment in one department was the last and logic step to 
deal appropriately with a research topic in a master thesis.  The question was which 
department to choose; one possibility was given by the project which selected historical 
disciplines/fields as objects of interests among other disciplines in order to provide variation 
and validity. Another reason linked to this one was seen in the importance of humanities at 
the University of Vienna in international comparison: humanities at this institution enjoy 
international reputation5 and thus the Department of Economic and Social History was chosen 
as being one of the humanities departments. At that point personal affinity came into play: I 
have been affiliated to this department in the past as a student myself.  
As already introduced, the case of interest is the University of Vienna and the Department of 
Economic and Social History which is part of the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies. 
Within this framework, personnel policies and the recruitment of professor are examined 
according to the presented situation and research question. For this reason legal and policy 
documents of the University of Vienna and on higher education in Austria are reviewed. The 
challenge of getting insight information on the internal dynamics of the University of Vienna 
and the Department of Economic and Social History is handled with expert interviews. Our 
                                                 
5 See for example ranking in Times Higher Education, World University Rankings (2011) 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2011-12/subject-ranking/subject/arts-and-
humanities, Accessed: 04.11.2013 
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time frame is focused on the recent decade, especially the years after the implementation of 
the UG 2002. 
 
1.3 Thematic relevance of master thesis 
Growing complexity of university functioning and the rising number of members have led to 
a situation where a new steering modus is being perceived as necessary. It is of peculiar 
interest for any organisation or institution to have competent staff. The same holds true for 
academia: securing academic junior should be of vital interest for future research. A positive 
scientific contribution of the thesis would be located within the question of how universities 
interact with their environment on a system level or how system level reform attempts 
ultimately affect university dynamics. Underlying assumption is that reform attempts have 
been promised but still have given little evidence on e.g. vehemence and pace. (Fumasoli et 
al. 2012) The thesis and its topic are only a stone in the mosaic of university changes but 
nevertheless try to enlighten the picture, especially when it comes to the interaction between 
different university levels in the field of professorial recruitment.  
Notwithstanding the above, there is the phenomenon of a scientific reproduction and 
specialisation mechanism. Clark (1983) for example describes knowledge and the strive for it 
as the core on which everything else in academia is dependent and based on. Weber in 
addition in his remarkable work on ‘Science as a vocation’ (Wissenschaft als Beruf6) points 
out that the intrinsic nature of science consists of growing accuracy and specialisation. We are 
standing on the shoulders of giants, building on former scientific results and adding gradually 
new pieces to it. This is especially important for research on and theory building of higher 
education since  
“research work of most career higher education scholars relies on previous higher 
education publications, and rarely applies more general, basic disciplinary 
approaches. Thus, higher education research hardly contributes to the theoretical 
development of the disciplines it claims to rely upon, while the field as such does not 
have - nor does it seem to aim at - developing a coherent paradigm of its own.” 
(Maassen 2000: 59-60) 
                                                 
6 see for example German version of ‘Wissenschaft als Beruf’ published by Reclam, 1995 
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For the thesis it would be presumptuous to claim a significant input for theory building in 
research on higher education. Still, this thesis will leave nothing untried and wants at least 
contribute in particular to 1) a better understanding of academic recruitment logics in higher 
education and specifically the university 2) a better understanding of university autonomy and 
3) give insight on practices at the working floor of the university.  
 
1.4 Thesis outline 
Chapter 1 has presented the introduction of our thesis by looking at reforms in university 
governance and personnel policies, and their occurrence at Austrian universities. Further we 
have proposed our research question and our case followed by the thematic relevance of our 
thesis.  
Chapter 2 now explores our underlying theories (authority in the university, tensions between 
formal and living university autonomy, and academic recruitment) and defines our analytical 
scheme according to which we want to research our case. The last major part of this chapter 
will outline the research methodology.  
Chapter 3 presents our empirical setting by providing facts and figures about the University of 
Vienna, the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies, and the Department of Economic and 
Social History. In the end some general statistics on the professorships at the university will 
be presented.  
Chapter 4 is characterising professorial recruitment in our case. Starting with the regulatory 
framework, we will focus on the recruitment of professors at three different levels: the 
preliminary level deals with the creation of posts, the intermediate level with search and 
selection mechanisms (incl. the Professorial Appointment Procedure of the University of 
Vienna), and the final level will discuss the employment conditions.  
Chapter 5 analyses and discusses professorial recruitment in our case. We will assess 
professorial recruitment according to centralisation, formalisation/standardisation, and 
flexibility aspects.  
Chapter 6 is our conclusion where we will come to a résumé of our research question and 
thesis.  
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2 THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
In this chapter we are going to provide the theoretical and analytical framework, and how 
research questions have been operationalised and implemented. The first section is a 
discussion on the underlying theories, beginning with Clark’s notion of authority in the 
university system, tensions between formal and living autonomy, and Musselin’s notion of 
academic recruitment in the university. Aim of this section is to provide a solid basis for our 
research topic, and an orientation within the university system. In addition, the setup of this 
theory section leads us gradually to the core topic of our research. The way of how we will 
structure and look on it, is subject matter of the second section. Starting point is the concept 
of living autonomy in the university. This is followed by characterising professorial 
recruitment in the first step, and presenting the variables in order to analyse professorial 
recruitment in the second step. The third and final section of this chapter deals with our 
research methodology. Here we will outline considerations on our case study design, sources 
of evidence, analytic strategy and approach, and conclude with remarks about the 
disadvantages and limitations of our approach.  
 
2.1 Exploring underlying theories 
2.1.1 Clark’s notion of authority in the university system 
In general, Clark (1983) distinguishes three overall levels in a university system: 1) the under-
structure which comprises the basic scientific units of a university, 2) the middle structure, the 
university/institutional level i.e. leadership and central administration, and 3) the super-
structure, the system level with superior bodies and actors. The levels are important for 
understanding the decision structure in academia. For the thesis the under-structure and the 
middle structure are of special interest or - to be more precise - the interaction between these 
two. A closer look reveals that the under-structure is divided again into a bottom which is the 
department or chair-institute combination in continental Europe, and a layer above which is 
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the faculty. The middle structure is the university as a whole consisting of all its faculties. 
(Clark 1983: 108-110) The authoritative forms of interest for us are as follows: 
• One is based on a personal/professorial rulership, characterised by the immanent 
expertise for the field and thus related with dominance and privileges. Professors in 
this context are protected by (informal) laws and codes which grants them power 
without accountability. This model appears in chair based systems where regulation by 
colleagues is only pro forma and the actual regulative power - the ministry - too 
distant.  
• The next form is characterised by stronger forms of collegial supervision, namely 
collegial rulership. Here, power is regulated and balanced by a group of peers, all of 
the same (professorial) status and with an elected head who is a primus inter pares. 
This is a form that appears often in departments and which is identified by a 
consensual tradition executed in regular meetings and therefore also highly dependent 
on the personality of the participating members (i.e. that some persons are more 
influential than others).  
• The model which is prevalent at the bottom is a mixture between the preceded forms: 
guild authority is personal/professorial rulership weakened by collective rule in which 
each professor is the master over sub-ordinates, but among and balanced by other 
colleague professors with their subordinates. (ibid:  110-115) 
Let us further take a brief look on Clark’s categorisation of those bureaucratic/administrative 
authorities which are relevant for our case: 
• The last authoritative form where power is discipline rooted is called professional 
authority. This form is based on technical competence protected by its bureaucratic 
position but still dependent on the profession it serves rather than the formal context in 
which it is situated.  The immanent nature of professional authority allows it to act 
either more particularistic in terms of personal profit and clients oriented (taking care 
of what is important for the department and its members), or universalistic in terms of 
societal standards and ideals (taking care of what is uniform with a superior societal 
perception even if it clashes with departmental needs). (ibid:  115-116) 
• Another form of administrative authority derives from enterprise-based authority, so 
to say authority at institutional/university level, and is marked as bureaucratic 
authority. Its structure and character is based on formal power and rules, consisting of 
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hierarchy and delegation. It forms a contrast to personal and collegial rule since it is 
impersonal in its nature. (Clark 1983: 118-119) 
For the sake of completeness and since this will be also to a certain extent relevant for our 
case, an introduction of what has been indicated already but is very difficult to grasp due to its 
nature: individual-dependent authority or as Clark said, charisma. In this form personal 
qualities gain exceptional power, a form which is neither predictable nor stable but context 
dependent and varying from case to case. Its unpredictable character however is damped by 
stable constellations and positions (e.g. being professor/hold a chair). (ibid: 123-124) 
The reason why we look at these different forms of authority is that they are interacting with 
each other when it comes to professorial recruitment. These interactions can either be more 
harmonic or more contradictory. The reason for it is that authority in its nature is expansive. 
(ibid: 110) Every form or level has different rationales and ideas of how professorial 
recruitment should take place and thus tries to exert influence. This becomes more obvious if 
we take a step back and look at the specific nature of universities and explore why reform 
attempts are difficult to handle in the university.  
 
2.1.2 Tensions between formal and living university autonomy 
The specific nature of universities 
A reason why reform attempts in the university are difficult to handle is provided by Musselin 
(2006) and her research on the specific nature of universities. She stresses the fact that the 
nature of academic work limits influence and eventually the effects of formal change at 
universities. Reform attempts are introducing more rules and more formalisation, but they are 
more influential on frame and structure. They have limited influence on content due to the 
specific nature of academic work. The same holds true for cooperation of the members 
because “[a]cademics remain autonomous in shaping their own activity and the way they 
prefer to develop them.” (ibid: 75) The formal layout and its unity - according to a neo-
institutionalist perspective - is an approach to perceive the university as an organisational 
whole. This approach is an explanation “why universities are organised in colleges or 
faculties, and then in departments. Once an organisation presents this kind of characteristics, 
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it is identified as a higher education institution.” (Musselin 2006: 76) The importance of rules 
and structures becomes visible (for departments) when boundaries are defined and 
delimitations are made. The introduction of rules enables the “defensive capacity [...][and][...] 
while trying to increase cooperation and coordination, they generally exacerbate the defensive 
potential of the already existing rules and structures.” (ibid: 76) 
Therefore, struggles are of specific quality when hitting the university directly in form of 
university reforms. An explanation for this phenomenon is provided by March and Olsen 
(1989). Based on an institutional approach, the university is with respect to its environment a 
robust institution (March and Olsen 1989, Olsen 2007) which has survived numerous changes 
throughout its long history and with immanent internal structures that are relatively resistant 
to changes and reform attempts (Maassen & Stensaker 2011). Indeed, the university has a 
very special relation to change. Clark (1983) brings it to the point by quoting the American 
educator Hesbergh who states that “the university is among the most traditional of all the 
institutions of our society and, at the same time, it is the institution most responsible for the 
changes that make our society the most changing in the history of man.” (ibid: 182) The 
ability to change is incremental and is also a result of the struggle between different interest 
groups where the grade of acceptable change is dependent on culture and (contradictory) 
beliefs: “[t]he struggle between stability and change appears operationally within systems as a 
clash of old vested interests and groups seeking to vest new interests.” (ibid: 217)  
 
Reform tensions in university autonomy 
As Enders et al. (2013) have pointed out, the understanding of university autonomy and the 
search of finding a common meaning and concept is accompanied by changes and tensions. 
For the concerned actors, autonomy itself has always been a high valued issue but has also 
been contested consistently. It is within the nature of autonomy to define itself also by 
distinction with regards to its environment. This applies especially to the right of the 
university to govern itself as well as to the rights of academics and their academic freedom in 
research, teaching and self-governance (Enders 2006). The university in modern times is an 
institution of special status with a distinctive model of autonomy and freedom. In the recent 
centuries the university could shape and strengthen its high degree of autonomy, being the 
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institution for science, and creating its own organisational culture. (Bourdieu 1988) But it had 
difficulties to develop as an organisation due to  
“very limited authority and capacity to regulate itself, e.g. in terms of its 
organizational boundaries, related entry and exit requirements, its size and shape, its 
broader character and functions. In consequence, universities were ‘bottom-heavy’ 
with low potency for collective action. Organizational leadership was weak compared 
to other organisations.” (Enders et al. 2013: 8) 
The transformation of universities is characterised by defining and perceiving them 
increasingly as organisations. Recent changes have introduced a new era of university 
autonomy or a different understanding of university autonomy especially with regards to the 
relation between autonomy and accountability. (ibid) Formally seen, universities have become 
more autonomous and independent from ministries concerning decision-making and 
management as ”governments have announced attempts to step back from the traditional 
regime of state control and to take a more distant framework setting role in the relationship 
with their universities.” (ibid: 9) At the same time influence and dependency are shifting: 
universities have to act more accountable and are subject to (quality) control systems and 
financial incentives that are performance related. (Christensen 2011, Gornitzka & Maassen 
2000) In other words, the state/ministry wields its power through control systems, financial 
incentives and performance management systems. 
However, when looking at the reform attempts one has to bear in mind that universities are 
not responding to reforms as other public administration units. (Christensen 2011) The 
structure and organisation is dependent on the core characteristics of higher education and has 
to regard the division of power, the support of variety and legitimating disorder. (Cohen et al. 
1972) Universities are specific organisations which are loosely coupled (Weick 1976) with 
regards to their core activities research and teaching, i.e. for example that coordination and 
cooperation is more defined by the discipline than by the university as such. In addition, 
research and teaching are unclear technologies which are difficult to grasp. (Musselin 2006)   
So transforming universities into organisations with a non-academic approach and without 
considering its special nature will raise some problems and limited success. One important 
issue in this respect is the question about the effects of the reforms and the new autonomy. As 
Olsen (2009) has pointed out one has to distinct between formal autonomy and actual, de 
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facto autonomy: there is a difference between autonomy on the paper and autonomy in daily 
practice. Latter is the possibility for an institution to interpret open spaces and room for 
manoeuvre within the legal framework. (Olsen 2009)  
This circumstance - a gap between formal and actual autonomy - has been conceptualised as 
living autonomy. (Fumasoli et al. 2012) This concept assumes that senior academic staff still 
has considerable possibilities to manoeuvre (e.g. in primary teaching and research activities) 
although formal final decision is now up to the executive structure. Since university reforms 
are applying to every part of the university, also the field of personnel policies and 
professorial recruitment are contested. This issue is of significant relevance since professors 
play a key role in the university.  
 
2.1.3 Musselin’s notion of academic recruitment in the university 
system 
Academic recruitment follows and is dependent on different logics. One is the professional 
perspective defined by disciplinary norms and values, and decided in the department. Another 
perspective is the institutional one where other objectives come into play. In addition, 
academic labour markets still are mainly dominated by national patterns. Characteristics and 
patterns in terms of “[s]alaries, status, recruitment procedures, workloads, career patterns, 
promotion rules” (Musselin 2005: 135) vary from country to country and limit the influence 
of emerging international convergences. Still, a certain trend has become visible: academic 
labour markets are increasingly regulated internally. In other words, change occurs in this 
respect in “the development of individual assessment and incentive devices in universities; 
and the increasing role of higher education institutions in the issues previously in the domains 
of the academic profession.” (ibid: 136) 
In conclusion, after given some theoretical considerations on the levels of authority, tensions 
between formal and practical university autonomy, and academic recruitment/labour markets, 
it is now time to connect them to our case. In order to elaborate in detail intra-university 
tensions within professorial recruitment evoked by reform attempts, it is necessary to proceed 
to the next section, and to take a look at our analytical scheme and how to measure and 
classify the outcomes of the case study.  
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2.2 Analytical scheme 
2.2.1 Starting point: living autonomy 
The autonomy of units and their integration within a system is also shaped by having 
established their own norms and rules of behaviour throughout history and tradition. This 
perspective questions the effect of formal changes and influence of the system on its units 
which in our case would be limited effects of system reform changes on universities. At least 
in order to understand practices of university autonomy it is important to examine how they 
are occurring besides formal terms. The consolidation of formal reform changes and the 
interpretation by the university is here defined as a concept of living autonomy. (Fumasoli et 
al. 2012) The success of reforms is therefore dependent on the learning capacity of the 
university as institution, and whether these changes are compatible with the institutional 
identity and thus accepted or rejected in practice. In order to measure structural changes as 
well as changes in organisational culture and values as a result of university reforms, 
following set of variables are defined by the concept of living autonomy: 
• Centralisation: This variable is connected to the question of authority, and 
distinguishes between formal and informal (dependant on personal authority rooted in 
expertise) authority. In order to assess the dispersion of authority, questions of interest 
are e.g. where decision making is taking place, which of the persons is in charge, or 
what the constraints are.  
• Formalisation: This variable is about the extent of written and filed communications 
and procedures. Special attention has to be given concerning the source of 
formalisation (legal requirement vs. individual ideas). It is to assume that a more in 
autonomy and accountability leads to a more in formalisation: managerialism as a 
product of increased autonomy claims formalisation of internal communication and 
procedures. In addition, accountability (performance and result orientation) is 
dependent on formalisation in order to present measurements to third parties.  
• Standardisation: Deals with making certain procedures (e.g. concerning decision-
making, information procedure, implementation) repeatable after a given set of rules. 
Despite that, roles are related to and dependant on these procedures (qualifications, 
performance, status, reward) and thus not based on personality characteristics. 
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Formalisation and standardisation are correlated since practices, procedures, etc. first 
need to be formalised before becoming standardised. 
• Flexibility: Describes the ability to change in terms of organisational structures and 
procedures. One special feature is related to the ability of absorbing environmental 
influences. The ability is measured according to vehemence and pace.  
Additionally, it is important to keep contextual variables in mind when examining university 
changes according to the variables presented above. Contextual variables may be history, size 
and disciplinary profile. 
 
2.2.2 Adaptation: structure and variables of professorial recruitment 
The thesis draws on these approaches and preliminary findings by taking them as a starting 
point. In fact, this paper wants to go a step further or - to be more precise - a step deeper. The 
university as an institution has to claim its autonomy externally (towards the system) as well 
as internally (towards its sub-units). Basic assumption is that norms and values originally 
emanate from the basic units of the university and that university/institutional identity is 
eventually the sum of all the sub-unit norms and values. Therefore the thesis wants to 
emphasise especially the intra-university tensions and focus on this tension on the basis of the 
professorial recruitment as part of university personnel policies. Aim is to research 
professorial recruitment practices and the room to manoeuvre between department - i.e. 
departmental leadership and academic staff - and the executive structure of the university.  
 
First analytic stage: characterising professorial recruitment 
In order to characterise professorial recruitment and to categorise our case, this paragraph will 
begin with identifying some general considerations on what the important patterns and stages 
in professorial recruitment are before specifying how we will look on it. This will lay the 
fundament of our first analytic stage - characterising professorial recruitment - before 
analysing this recruitment process according to our variables in the second analytic stage. 
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To sum up again, the most important and relevant assumption on academic labour markets 
made by Musselin (2005) for this case is that these markets are still nationally shaped. 
However, they share and face a common trend: increasing focus on individual assessment and 
stimulation, and growing importance of the institution in a field traditionally regulated by the 
profession. The four mechanisms (see Musselin 2013: 33-34) in characterising and analysing 
academic labour markets are: 
1. Selection 
2. Pre-tenure period 
3. Balance between internal and external labour markets 
4. Price determination 
Coming back to the findings of the comparative study on higher education reforms in Western 
European countries - as presented in the introductory chapter - following categories within the 
field of recruitment processes according to the thematic charts of the study (Paradeise et al. 
2009: 267-274) could be identified and summarised:  
o the influence of different actors on recruitment decision and regulation 
o positions creation and funding of positions 
o call and announcements 
o internal appointments vs. mobility 
o employment contract of (new) professors and salaries/negotiations  
Further, Fumasoli and Goastellec (forthcoming 2014, para. 1) in their work on academic 
recruitment in Switzerland have characterised recruitment as follows:  
1. The first stage refers to the question of how positions are created. Is a position e.g. 
open because of replacement or is it a complete new creation, and is it staffed by 
public or individual call? 
2. The second stage refers to the determination of the openings i.e. what are the 
underlying reasons and where is demand for what kind of position, as well as if and 
how these are made public. 
3. The third stage deals with the selection procedures, and the question of who is 
contributing to decision-making and with what kind of influence-taking based on 
prerogatives.  
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4. The fourth stage looks at the negotiations on employment conditions with focus on 
actors and their radius of operation.  
5. The fifth stage has to take formal rules into account and what kind of authority in the 
appointment procedure exists. 
The special feature of this recruitment procedure is that all stages implicate various 
actors/groups with different perspectives and prerogatives. Of special interest for our case as 
well is the group of professors and university management (executive structure, management, 
delegates) in the recruitment process. Despite that, public authorities could also have a 
substantial influence on recruitment e.g. by determining salaries. Finally, one has to keep in 
mind that different logics (i.e. disciplinary, institutional, national, and global) are coming into 
play when dealing with recruitment. (Fumasoli & Goastellec forthcoming 2014) 
In combining and comparing these different approaches, following recruitment perspective 
and categorisation has emerged and represents our first analytic stage, when characterising 
professorial recruitment at the University of Vienna/Department of Economic and Social 
History (see Chapter 3): 
 
 
Table 1: Characterising professorial recruitment (own categorisation) 
Regulatory framework 
 
• Which laws constitute the recruitment 
process? 
• What are the formal power sources? 
 
At this stage formal power authority is 
defined by law and constitution. This level 
can be seen as the formal basis for 
recruitment processes. 
Preliminary level 
 
• How is a position created and 
funded? 
At this level, the actual recruitment process is 
launched. Consideration is given to the 
creation and the funding of positions. Of 
interest is to find out what the underlying 
rationales are e.g. reason, demand, and 
emergence. 
27 
 
Intermediate level 
 
• How is the position announced? 
• Who are the possible candidates? 
• How is selection taking place and 
under what aspects is it executed? 
• Who are the relevant actors? 
• How is authority (influence and 
power) dispersed? 
This level can be seen as core level of the 
recruitment process. At this level several 
logics and mechanisms - which are 
connected to each other - come into play. 
One aspect concerns the way of how a 
position is announced (call); an issue that is 
related to and defined by it, is the candidate 
pool which is based on considerations about 
pre-tenure phases or the balance between 
internal and external markets (e.g. internal 
appointments vs. mobility) 
The next aspect then concerns the selection 
procedures and is linked to the aspect of 
power and influence of the relevant actors. 
Final level 
 
• Who is negotiating? 
• How do negotiations look like? 
• What are the employment conditions? 
 
This level represents a phase where the 
recruitment process/cycle is coming into an 
end. This phase is characterised by 
negotiations between employer and 
employee. Special focus is given to the 
employment conditions and price 
determination in general, and resources, 
salaries and contract in particular.  
 
A structural and linguistic consideration shall be given here especially with regards to our 
case. As we will see in the following it is important to distinguish strictly between 
‘recruitment process’ and ‘appointment procedure’. According to our presented model above, 
the meaning of recruitment is more stretched than the meaning of appointment. The term 
recruitment is referring to a process that spans all our levels, including the actual appointment. 
In other words, appointment refers to a special mechanism within the recruitment process; this 
will become obvious in our case as we will see in the following chapters. Here for example, 
the official term/procedure for recruiting/appointing a professor at the University of Vienna is 
the ‘Professorial Appointment Procedure’ which covers certain fields within our analytic 
levels. But we are interested in more than the actual ‘Professorial Appointment Procedure’ 
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4), the second analysis will analyse this professorial recruitment according to our variables 
(Chapter 5). 
 
Second analytic stage: assessing professorial recruitment 
 
o Centralisation 
Centralisation: This variable is connected to the question of authority, and distinguishes 
between formal and informal (dependant on personal authority rooted in expertise) authority. 
In order to assess the dispersion of authority, questions of interest are e.g. where decision 
making is taking place, which of the persons is in charge, or what the constraints are.  
 
Table 2: variable ‘Centralisation’ 
Adaptation professorial recruitment Indicators  
In this case, the question of importance is to 
evaluate how authority in the recruitment 
process is dispersed i.e. who is in charge or 
who are the relevant actors. Since we assume 
a strengthened executive structure and 
management, it is of interest to keep the 
power balance between new structures and 
the department in mind.  
• Identify where decision-making is 
taking place 
• Identify who controls (human) 
resources 
• Identify who controls the recruitment 
process 
 
o Formalisation 
Formalisation: The extent of written and filed communications and procedures. Special 
attention has to be given concerning the source of formalisation (legal requirement vs. 
individual ideas). It is to assume that a more in autonomy and accountability leads to a more 
in formalisation: managerialism as a product of increased autonomy claims formalisation of 
30 
 
internal communication and procedures. In addition, accountability (performance and result 
orientation) is dependent on formalisation in order to present measurements to third parties. 
 
Table 3: variable ‘Formalisation’ 
Adaptation professorial recruitment Indicators 
Here it is important to assess how the 
recruitment process has been formalised, and 
how formalisation has emerged. In other 
words, what is the frame of the professorial 
recruitment and under which circumstances 
has it developed? 
• Extent of written and filed procedures 
• Underlying reasons of establishment 
• Identify source of formalised 
recruitment process 
 
o Standardisation 
Standardisation: Deals with making certain procedures (e.g. concerning decision-making, 
information procedure, implementation) repeatable after a given set of rules. Despite that, 
roles are dependant and related to these procedures (qualifications, performance, status, 
reward) and thus not based on personality characteristics.  
 
Table 4: variable ‘Standardisation’ 
Adaptation for professorial recruitment Indicators 
With this variable we want to assess a 
standardised recruitment process with the 
Professorial Appointment Procedure as 
crucial point. Of interest is how 
standardisation and its mechanisms occur, 
and to identify possible characteristics. 
• Occurrence of standardisation and its 
mechanisms 
• Characteristics of standardised 
recruitment process 
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o Flexibility 
Flexibility: Describes the ability to change in terms of organisational structures and 
procedures. One special feature is related to the ability of absorbing environmental 
influences. The ability is measured according to vehemence and pace. 
 
Table 5: variable ‘Flexibility’ 
Adaptation professorial recruitment Indicators 
Of central interest is to identify how the 
recruitment process has changed in the 
course of the university act and to what 
extent traditional ways of handling 
professorial recruitment have been damped 
or absorbed by the practices of its actors. 
• Possible counteractions against 
and/or different approaches in 
relation to the 
centralised/formalised/standardised 
recruitment process 
• How the recruitment process can 
adapt to specific conditions 
 
Having now presented the analytical approach for answering our research question, it is now 
time to proceed with some technical considerations in order to strengthen the validity of our 
assumptions and findings.  
 
2.3 Research methodology 
2.3.1 The nature of our single case study 
Yin (2009) makes following definitions about case studies as research methods: 
“1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
o investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, 
especially when 
o the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” (ibid: 
18) 
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Eligibility of the case is given by Bryman (2008) who points out that in “a case study, the 
case is an object of interest in its own right, and the researcher aims to provide an in-depth 
elucidation of it.” (ibid: 54) Further, the nature of a case study is defined by the fact that it 
focuses on the ‘how’ and the ‘what’ of social phenomena in real life where the researcher has 
little influence on the case itself. (Yin 2009: 2) While the ‘how’ may be nearer to an 
explanatory approach - how are practices in the professors recruitment changing - the sub-
questions ‘what changes?’ which are our actual core interest are more of exploratory nature.  
In order to identify how practices in the recruitment of professors in our case change (or 
precisely not), we first have to identify what might lead to that change. We will satisfy this 
interest by looking on formal changes (e.g. legal framework, organisational setting of the 
professors recruitment) but also on informal changes (e.g. how are new leeways implemented 
and new manoeuvring rooms filled in the professors recruitment) always keeping in mind that 
changes might not have the output as originally intended.  
Hence, our case is mainly located within the boundaries of being a ‘critical case’ (ibid: 47) 
since it tries to test the theory and considerations provided by the FLAGSHIP project in the 
beginning. In addition, it is overlapping with being a ‘revelatory case’ (ibid: 48) since we try 
to approach a dimension which is well-known by its immanent actors but relatively unknown 
from a scientific perspective. Internal university dynamics of the European universities in 
general and the Austrian university in special (Vienna), and their responses and reactions to 
latest reform attempts are still more assumed and as result rather unknown than being proved. 
In order to summarise and round off this paragraph, some additional theoretical 
considerations on case studies made by Yin (2009) should be outlined here: 
“1. The case study inquiry 
o copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
o relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result 
o benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis.” (ibid: 18) 
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Let us discuss these issues more in-depth in the next paragraphs: the multiple sources of 
evidence of our case, analysing them by triangulation and concluding with an elaboration of 
the disadvantages and limitations for a single case study approach.  
 
2.3.2 Sources of evidence 
In order to identify and analyse formal and informal change, the thesis is going to examine 
two sources of evidence. The first one will be documents, examining mainly the formal 
change of institutional autonomy and the organisational setting with regards to the recruitment 
process of professors. The second one is conducting interviews with key members in 
university organisation, especially with members of the Department of Economic and Social 
History in order to grasp the more hidden and underlying effects of the reform effects in the 
professorial recruitment. Statistical data as an additional source of evidence was used and 
collected in order to contextualise the case. (see Chapter 3) 
Concerning the data collection it might be needless to say that in the times of increasing 
(online) interconnectedness, the internet played a substantial role in producing this paper. 
Therefore, it should be at least mentioned that a lot of fundamental research was made by the 
use of it; this refers to the collection of basic information and numbers about the case, 
gathering related policy papers, identifying relevant actors in university structure, and finally 
contacting them.  
 
Documents 
Documents are a common source in case studies. Their advantage is that they can be reviewed 
continuously, provide technical information in terms of names or references, and can cover a 
broad field of interest. In addition, they are a valuable source prior to field visits. On the other 
hand, their accessibility can be limited, and they can be a biased source when collection was 
made too selective. (Yin 2009) 
The documents that have been used in our study - presented in the figure below - are as 
follows: 
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Table 6: Documents 
Title of 
document 
Published by Version Page number Access 
Universities Act 
2002 
Austrian Federal 
Chancellery (Legal 
information system, 
RIS) 
21.11.2013 
(German, 
English 
12/2007) 
92 Online   
Amendment 
2009* 
Austrian Federal 
Chancellery (Legal 
information system, 
RIS) 
18.08.2009  
(German) 
24 Online 
Organisational 
Plan 
2004/2013** 
University of Vienna 
(Internal university 
information system: 
Mitteilungsblatt) 
9.11.2006 
(2004 plan, 
German) 
14.11.2012 
(2013 plan, 
German) 
13/13 Online 
Development 
Plan 2015 
University of Vienna 
(Rectorate of the 
university) 
January 2012 
(German 
version) 
113 Online 
Document on 
the 
‘Professorial 
Appointment 
Procedure’ 
University of 
Vienna 
(Professorial 
Appointment 
Procedure: 
Berufungsverfahren) 
date of version 
unknown, 
latest access: 
21.11.2013 
(German) 
5 Online 
 
* The current, updated Universities Act 2002 includes the changes of the Amendment 2009. The version 
presented here is the separate version of the Amendment 2009. 
**A special comment should be given here concerning the Organisational Plan 2013; this plan became formally 
active in January 2013. However, our time of interest mostly spans the recent decade when the 2004 plan was 
active. Therefore, findings and argumentations are mostly based on this version, taking variations of the 2013 
plan into account when necessary. 
35 
 
Concerning the assessment of the documents quality, following four criteria are outlined by 
Scott (1990): 
“1. Authenticity. Is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin? 
2. Credibility. Is the evidence free from error and distortion? 
3. Representativeness. Is the evidence typical of its kind, and, if not, is the extent of its 
untypicality known? 
4. Meaning. Is the evidence clear and comprehensible?” (ibid: 6) 
In general, all our documents meet the quality requirements. The authenticity of all 
documents can be rated as high, especially concerning genuineness and origin. All documents 
are available as an online-pdf and thus an online-copy of the ‘original’. The legal information 
system of Austria generates pdf-files at the date of access. The documents are revised or have 
been revised constantly. Since they are of public interest for the concerned members, error 
and distortion rate can be assumed low, and representativeness high. The language style is 
oriented towards legal writing, especially with regards to the law documents. All have in 
common that they provide legal and structural information on the recruitment process. Of 
special interest in this respect is the last document on the ‘Professorial Appointment 
Procedure’.  
 
Interviews 
The interviews should reveal mainly how the recruitment process is taking place in practice: 
within legal boundaries, a place that is only visible for those who act in it. The explorative 
character of the thesis led to the assumption that persons in key positions - with regards to 
institutional change and the professors recruitment at the university - would be of relevance. 
The persons were identified through the documents and website research. Therefore different 
levels and different groups were involved: university level (3), faculty level (3) and 
departmental level (7).7 They were active as academics (9) and as administrators (3) or to be 
more precise, the ratio between professorial/non-professorial staff/administrative staff was 
6:3:3, the ratio male-female 7:5.  
                                                 
7Holding positions at different levels (e.g. faculty and department) was counted twice here. 
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Table 7: Composition interview partners  
 University 
level 
Faculty level Departmental 
level 
Total* 
Academics 1 3 6 10  
 - Full professors 1 2 3 6 
 - Non-professorial - 1 3 4 
Administrators 2 - 1 3 
Male 2 2 4 8 
Female 1 1 3 5 
*Persons holding important positions at different levels were counted twice here. 
 
In order to catch a possible ‘cultural’ and ‘mental’ change of the transition period, interviews 
with persons who have already been active around the year 2002 were extremely valuable. 
Each potential interview partner was contacted by email with comprehensive information 
about the research and the research questions. In cases where no response came, phone calls 
were made as well. The respond rate was relatively high: 17 persons were contacted, in the 
end 12 persons agreed to participate.8 All of the interviews were conducted face-to-face and in 
German. During the interview notes were taken, and a recording device was used when the 
interview partner agreed on it. The interviews normally took 45-60 min. Right after having 
conducted the interviews an interview report was written (see Gläser and Laudel 2009: 192) 
including notes about interview features and situation. After all interviews had been 
conducted they were transcribed (in German) and then summarised (in English). 
• Questionnaire  
The interviews should reveal information that lies beyond the available and accessible 
material. (Gläser and Laudel 2009: 151) Due to the exploratory nature of our approach and 
the unknown topic it was necessary to conduct semi-structured interviews with open ended 
questions. This means that certain issues/subject fields were already pre-defined but with 
                                                 
8 Refusing to participate in the interviews was based on following reasons: at the departmental level, some 
contacted persons assumed that it would be enough if another representative of the department would answer on 
the interview questions. In general (at university, faculty, and departmental level) it was difficult to interview 
persons with administrative functions. Either they delegated the request, thought they were not the ‘right’ 
contacts, or strictly denied to participate (also after having emphasised the importance of their participation).  
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enough room for leaving the scheduled track, and focus spontaneously on issues that would 
attract interest. (Bryman 2008) Still, it was important not to drift too far away, and to come 
back to a common thread. Fields of interest in the questionnaire (excerpt9) were as follows: 
o Power relations within professorial recruitment 
o Room to manoeuvre within professorial recruitment 
o Limitations/Constraints within professorial recruitment 
o ‘Advantages/Disadvantages’ within professorial recruitment 
Concerning the above presented questions of interest it was important to keep the position of 
the particular respondent in mind (e.g. management, faculty, department, etc.) Thus, generally 
the same interview guide was used for all respondents with modifications concerning 
influence possibilities of the different levels (university/management, faculty, department). 
Nevertheless, common thread was always exploring the room to manoeuvre between 
executive structure and the department, requesting related information on the department and 
with a stronger emphasis on their influence possibilities. 
• Language and translation 
One of the major challenges in handling the interviews was the language issue. In order to 
receive comprehensive information without language barriers it was important to conduct the 
interviews in the native/common language of the university (German10). But this translocated 
the problem, as the language problem certainly occurred at another point namely when 
transferring the content and meaning of the interviews into English. The first step was to 
transcribe the interviews in German. On this basis it was possible to summarise the interviews 
directly into English. The step in-between could have been to fully translate (re-transcribe) the 
German transcription into an English transcription and then to summarise it. But this would 
have been a) even more time-consuming and b) expensive if done professionally, both not 
appropriate when looking at the available time and framework conditions of this master 
thesis. Another consideration to skip this step in the end was that the study is not dependent 
on linguistic nuances but on university reform effects; in order to grasp the effects it was 
sufficient enough to understand them in German, and having a German transcription as 
reference text. 
                                                 
9See Appendix for compact interview guide 
10
 The author is a German native-speaker 
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For translating the interviews (and as a general help for the whole writing process) two 
sources were used when necessary: firstly, the online dictionary dict.cc11 to get a direct 
translation or a synonym of a particular German word. Secondly, the Oxford Advanced 
Learner’s Dictionary12 was used in order to conceive the meaning of an English word by 
understanding it through the English notion. 
• Confidentiality issues 
The master thesis is written within the master programme ‘Higher Education’ at the 
Department of Education which is part of the Faculty of Educational Sciences, University of 
Oslo, and therefore subject to Norwegian law. Research that is dealing with sensitive personal 
information has to be reported to The Data Protection Official for Research (Norwegian 
Social Science Data Services). Interview recordings exist on three devices: working place at 
the University of Oslo, personal laptop, and securing (recording) device. Persons with insight 
on interview transcripts and summaries were the author and the supervisor of the thesis. 
Anonymisation was then made by labelling audio files, transcripts (German), and summaries 
(English) with INT-1 to INT-12 (‘interview one’ to ‘interview twelve’) based on an own 
encrypted system. Audio recording was only made upon request; the first request was made 
when the interview partner was contacted, the second request was made before the actual 
interview session began. It was always possible to pause audio recordings when demanded.  
 
2.3.3 Analytic strategy and triangulation of data 
Analytic strategy 
The most common analytic strategy which was used here mainly was to rely on the theoretical 
assumptions prior to conducting the case study. (Yin 2009: 127-136) These were in the very 
beginning considerations on university reforms and changes in institutional autonomy, and 
eventually project findings. These considerations served as an important guide through 
literature and for defining our case interest. And while they were more general and shallow at 
                                                 
11dict.cc is an Austrian online-dictionary, mainly for German-English translations, see Dict.cc (2013) Deutsch-
Englisch-Wörterbuch, http://www.dict.cc/, Accessed: 13.11.2013 
12 Oxford (2000): Oxford-Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (6th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press 
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the starting point they became narrower during the course of the thesis i.e. questioning the 
reform effects, and looking at the sphere of influence between executive structure and 
department in the professorial recruitment. In parallel, a case description has been developed 
in order to get the case study going and to collect data. (Yin 2009: 79-82) Despite that, 
sometimes the first analytic strategy ‘got stuck’. As we will see in the following, it is in the 
nature of such an approach to adjust and revise theoretical positions.  
To rely on theoretical intentions becomes especially important when dealing with our analytic 
technique. Our questions address a lot of descriptive and exploratory research. In the end 
however, they should also contribute to a little extent to explanation building. This technique 
is described as being “a special type of pattern matching” (ibid: 141) and the goal is to deliver 
an explanation of how and why something happened. The most common form to do this is a 
narrative form. However, because narratives in nature are not a precise method, it is important 
that “the explanations have reflected some theoretically significant propositions.” (ibid: 141) 
in order to improve the quality of the case study.  
Our theoretical propositions are in general to question university reforms attempts according 
to their indented output. This becomes visible through an emerging executive structure which 
has formal power, meeting an academic domain which has informal power.  Hence, breaking 
our theoretical propositions down into our case, the first analytic technique is the descriptive 
and exploratory analysis of the recruitment process (Chapter 4) followed by an 
evaluation/location of it according to our variables (Chapter 5). The aim is to make sense of 
our research question and to assess university change in professorial recruitment evoked by 
reforms. But - and this is the major limitation when it comes to explanation building - it is 
important to keep in mind that we are only researching how the recruitment is changing 
according to our variables but not why they are changing; this would namely go beyond the 
scope of our case study.  
 
Triangulation of data 
In order to improve the quality of sense-making, explanation has to be based on multiple 
sources, an approach which is called triangulation. According to Bryman (2008) triangulation 
is “[t]he use of more than one method or source of data in the study of a social phenomenon 
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Table 8: Data Analysis and Representation, Case Study13 
Data Analysis 
and 
Representation 
Research 
approach (Case 
Study) 
Case 
Data managing Create and 
organise files for 
data 
Data professorial recruitment University of 
Vienna/Department of Economic and Social History 
(literature, statistical data, documents, interviews) 
Reading, 
memoing 
Read through 
text, make margin 
notes, form initial 
codes 
Data extraction and assignment 
Describing Describe the case 
and its context 
1) Context (Case): 
University/Faculty/Department/Professorship 
(CHAPTER 3) 
2) Case: Recruitment process of professors => 
Regulatory framework 
Preliminary level 
Intermediate level 
Final level 
(CHAPTER 4) 
Classifying Use categorical 
aggregation to 
establish themes 
or patterns 
Centralisation 
Formalisation 
Standardisation 
Flexibility 
(CHAPTER 5) 
Interpreting Use direct 
interpretation 
Develop 
naturalistic 
generalisations 
Relate data extracts and case/context descriptions  to 
categories 
(CHAPTER 5) 
 
                                                 
13 Based on Creswell (2007, pp. 156-157) Table. 2 Data Analysis and Representation, by Research Approaches 
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Representing, 
visualising 
Present in-depth 
picture of the case 
(or cases) using 
narrative, tables, 
and figures 
Development and effects of university reforms on 
the basis of the recruitment process, presentation of 
the case according to categories, overall changes in 
the recruitment process of professors and extent of 
change 
(CHAPTER 5 + CHAPTER 6) 
 
2.3.4 Disadvantages and limitations of our single case study 
approach 
Let us now assess the quality of our research design according to construct validity, internal 
validity, external validity, and reliability (Yin 2009) and reveal the disadvantages and 
limitations that emerge with discussing them.  
• Construct validity 
In order to ensure construct validity of this study main emphasis was given as follows: firstly, 
to rely on previous concepts and studies while focusing simultaneously on current and 
ongoing research findings. These were - as already pointed out in our ‘analytic strategy’ 
passage - considerations on university reforms and changes in institutional autonomy. 
Concerning our very special topic, it was also important to receive stimuli from the project 
and to have insight into other researchers’ work. Secondly, multiple sources of evidence have 
been used in order to substantiate the argumentation line (e.g. university documents and 
interviews with key members). 
• Internal validity 
Because internal validity concerns explanatory studies this does not apply to ‘characterising 
professorial recruitment’ (first analytic stage) since in this part our focus is more of 
descriptive and exploratory nature rather than being explanatory. Like we have described this 
in our ‘analytic strategy’ passage, we are not explaining specifically why professorial 
recruitment is changing (or not) but how.  Explanation building within our scope refers only 
to ‘analysing professorial recruitment’ according to our specified variables (second analytic 
stage) and at best it can provide indicators for explaining a general change. Within this scope 
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we can try to point out elements that would eventually lead to causal inferences but the thesis 
itself is not providing such. 
• External validity 
Limits or concerns about case studies are based - among others - on the argument that case 
studies might have little ability to make generalisations or draw general conclusions. 
Undoubtedly this would apply also to our case since it is limited to professorial recruitment at 
one university/department. However, purpose of a case study is “to expand and generalize 
theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical 
generalization).” (Yin 2009: 15) In addition, although singular case studies can be dangerous 
in terms of general validity, the risks for the approach of this thesis are dampen by the fact 
that it is conducted within the boundaries of the FLAGSHIP project which will carry out 
research at different departments and universities. In other words, when it comes to the 
generalisation of university reform effects, our case is rather a part of a multiple case study 
approach than being a single case study of its own.  
• Reliability 
The question of reliability concerns in general in which ways a study is repeatable. The 
objective is “to minimize the errors and biases in a study.” (Yin 2009: 45) However, even if 
this issue applies more to quantitative than qualitative studies (Bryman 2008) it is still an 
important criterion for a qualitative approach. One possibility to solve this problem according 
to Yin (2009) is to develop a database which is done here in the end of data collection by 
structuring and organising all sources and evidences in a replicable way according to the 
research development. In addition the case study was to a certain extent embedded in the 
project and followed a similar research and data collection approach while being reviewed by 
project researchers (i. a. supervisor) which in sum is an important feature of improving the 
reliability of an (explorative) case study. (Riege 2003) 
 
Having now outlined in detail underlying theories, analytical schemes, and methodological 
considerations of our case, we will now proceed with the empirical setting of our research in 
the next chapter. In this way the reader should get a better understanding of how our case of 
interest looks like and where our research has been conducted.  
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3 EMPIRICAL SETTING 
 
In this chapter we want to present and outline our case context and find out where our 
research questions are located. The first section presents the University of Vienna by 
providing information on profile, facts and figures, and the organisational structure. The 
second section provides some information on organisational structure and profile of the 
Faculty of Historical and Cultural Sciences. In the third section information on the 
Department of Economic and Social History is given concerning academic profile and key 
numbers. The fourth section outlines the current situation of the professorship by providing 
key numbers on professors and professorships.  
The data and statistics that are collected here will also be of importance when analysing and 
discussing our findings. Basically, most of the data was extracted from the websites of the 
particular institutions. After collection, they were paraphrased here. In order to ensure 
transparency, the particular web-links are quoted directly in the footnotes (in addition to their 
appearance in the reference list). Some figures were created on the basis of numbers of the 
statistical Austrian online-tool for higher education uni:data14. Unfortunately, this database 
only includes overall university numbers which means no data on faculty or departmental 
level. Despite that, most of the data was only available since 2005, except from some student 
numbers (reference period/date: winter term/ 31.12. of the particular year). In general, these 
information are supplied without liability; the only purpose is to reveal an overall trend. 
 
3.1 University of Vienna 
3.1.1 Profile 
In 1365 the University of Vienna was funded by Duke Rudolph IV, being the oldest 
university in the German-speaking area. It is nowadays one of the biggest universities in 
Europe with over 92.500 students and around 9.500 employees (hereof 6.700 scientific staff) 
                                                 
14 Uni:data, Datawarehouse Hochschulbereich des Bundesministeriums für Wissenschaft und Forschung (2013) 
(Higher education database of the Federal Ministry of Science and Research)  
https://oravm13.noc-science.at/apex/f?p=103:36, Accessed: 13.11.2013 
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and the biggest research and educational institution in Austria.  The University of Vienna 
offers a broad spectrum of studies with a total of over 180 programmes. Research and 
teaching is conducted in the 15 faculties and in the 4 centres of the University. Due to its size 
and the expansion in the recent decades (educational boom in the 1970ies, increasing student 
number), the university today has over 60 locations with the main building on the 
Universitätsring as the centre of the University of Vienna. In this respect two important 
events took place in the recent history of the university: the university campus was established 
1998 on the site of the former General Hospital, and the Medical Faculty became a separate 
university in 2004.15 
 
3.1.2 Facts and figures 
Staff and student numbers at the present moment (November 2013) are outlined as follows on 
the university’s website:16 
 
Table 9: Staff members of the University of Vienna 
 
Women Men Total 
 Academic university staff 3.097 3.635 6.732 
 Non-academic university staff 1.730 1.233 2.963 
 Total university staff 4.734 4.758 9.492 
Status quo: 31 December 2012 (adjusted headcount; without persons on leave; persons with more than one 
employment counted once)    
 
 
 
                                                 
15 University of Vienna, History of the University of Vienna (2013) 
http://www.univie.ac.at/en/university/history-of-the-university-of-vienna/, Accessed: 13.11.2013 
16 University of Vienna, Figures and Facts (2013) 
http://www.univie.ac.at/en/university/figures-and-facts/, Accessed: 13.11.2013 
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Table 10: Students at the University of Vienna 
 
Women Men Total 
Austrians 42.962 24.548 67.510 
 International students 15.374 9.602 24.976 
 Total 58.336 34.150 92.486 
Status quo: winter semester 2012/13   
 
Table 11: Composition of the university revenues 
Global budget 379 Mio EUR 
Study fees 6 Mio EUR 
Other (e.g. Further education at the University, research) 137 Mio EUR 
Total 522 Mio EUR 
Status quo: end of 2012   
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The overall evolution at the university occurs as follows (data based on own calculations): 
 
 
Figure 3: Staff numbers - Development17, NB: The total number is not exactly the summary of academic 
university staff and non-academic university staff.  
 
                                                 
17 Staff numbers - Development, own Excel table, data collected at: 
https://oravm13.noc-science.at/apex/f?p=103:36, Accessed: 13.11.2013 
=> Auswertungen => Personal => Universitäten => Personal an Universitäten - Kopfzahl (Universität Wien) 
Winter 
term 
2005
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term 
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term 
2007
Winter 
term 
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term 
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term 
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Winter 
term 
2011
Winter 
term 
2012
Academic university staff 5154 5693 6219 6480 6747 6660 6755 6732
Non-academic university staff 2004 2082 2311 2295 2301 2901 2916 2963
Total university staff 7040 7624 8327 8586 8864 9369 9496 9492
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Figure 4: Student numbers - Development18 (st = summer term, wt = winter term) 
 
Both figures show that the number of members grew constantly during the recent years. Total 
number of staff is almost reaching 10.000. Especially the student numbers increased in the 
recent decade, there are around 25.000 (!) students more compared to 2002.   
                                                 
18 Student numbers - Development, own Excel table, data collected at:  
https://oravm13.noc-science.at/apex/f?p=103:36, Accessed: 13.11.2013 
=> Auswertungen => Statistisches Taschenbuch => Studierende => 2 - 4 Studierende nach Universitäten 
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3.1.3 Organisational structure 
University management with the University Board, the Rectorate and the Senate is on the top 
level.19 Research and teaching is taking place in 15 faculties and 4 centres. With regards to the 
organisational plan faculties and centres are also described as scientific organisational units of 
the university with research and teaching tasks.20 Research Platforms are organisational units 
between the faculties and comprise innovative and interdisciplinary research.21 The 
Studienpräses and the 48 Directorates of Studies are dealing with the organisation of studies 
and issues that arise from law matters concerning studies.22 Organisation of administration is 
carried out by 11 University Offices, 5 Administrative Departments and the Office for Quality 
Assurance.23 Special bodies are the Equal Opportunities Working Party, the Ethics 
Committee, and the Arbitration Commission.24 The Civil Service Associations are: the Works 
Council for the Scientific Staff, the Works Council for the General University Staff, and the 
Austrian National Union of Students at the University of Vienna.25 Subsidiaries of the 
university are the innovation centre (Innovationszentrum Universität Wien GmbH) (100 %) 
with the subordinated Innovation into Business GmbH (37 %) and the Vienna University 
Children’s Office (100%). Further the career centre (UNIPORT Karriereservice Universität 
Wien GmbH) (74. 99%), Max F. Perutz Laboratories GmbH (60 %) and the 
WasserclusterLunz GmbH (33. 33 %).26 
                                                 
19 University of Vienna, University Management (2013) 
http://www.univie.ac.at/en/organisation/university-management/, Accessed: 23.11.2013 
20 University of Vienna, Organisation in the field of science (2013) 
http://www.univie.ac.at/en/organisation/faculties-and-centres/, Accessed: 23.11.2013 
21 University of Vienna, Research Platforms (2013) 
http://rektorat.univie.ac.at/en/research-platforms/, Accessed: 23.11.2013 
22 University of Vienna, Organisation of studies and courses (2013) 
http://www.univie.ac.at/en/organisation/organsation-of-studies-and-courses/, Accessed: 23.11.2013 
23University of Vienna, Organisation of the administration (2013) 
http://www.univie.ac.at/en/organisation/administration-and-service/, Accessed: 23.11.2013,  
24University of Vienna, Special Bodies (2013) 
http://www.univie.ac.at/en/organisation/special-bodies/, Accessed: 23.11.2013 
25University of Vienna, Civil Service Associations (2013) 
http://www.univie.ac.at/en/organisation/civil-service-associations/, Accessed: 13.11.2013 
26 University of Vienna, Subsidiaries of the University of Vienna (2013) 
http://www.univie.ac.at/en/organisation/subsidiaries-of-the-university-of-vienna/, Accessed: 23.11.2013 
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Figure 5: Organisation University of Vienna (snapshot of interactive pdf)27 
                                                 
27
 University of Vienna, Overview (2013) 
http://www.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/uni_startseite/pdfs_downloads/ueberblicken_20130117.pdf,  
Accessed: 13.11.2013 
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3.2 Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies 
3.2.1 Organisational structure 
The Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies comprises 13 departments and 3 sub-units, 
including a total of 46 professorships.28 The faculty is led by one dean and two vice deans, 
supported by the dean’s office. The Departments are:  
• Department of Egyptology 
• Department of Ancient History, Papyrology and Epigraphy 
• Department of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 
• Department of European Ethnology 
• Department of History 
• Department of Jewish Studies 
• Department of Classical Archaeology 
• Department of History of Art 
• Department of Numismatics and Monetary History 
• Department of East European History 
• Department of Prehistoric and Historical Archaeology 
• Department of Economic and Social History 
• Department of Contemporary History 
The Sub-units of the faculty are: 
• Vienna Institute for Archaeological Science 
• Dean’s office of the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies 
• Studies Service Center Historical and Cultural Studies 
 
 
                                                 
28 Number of professorships has been collected directly from the departmental websites (this information is 
supplied without liability!):  
University of Vienna, List of Departments (Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies) (2013) 
http://online.univie.ac.at/inst?lang=en&kapitel=40, Accessed: 23.11.2013 
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3.2.2 Profile 
Research focus29 of the faculty is divided into four categories: area, society, knowledge, and 
media. Within the category ‘area’ emphasis is given to the cultures of the Euro-Mediterranean 
area and classical studies - historical and cultural European studies - Austria and its 
environment - and global history. The category ‘society’ focuses on community concepts, 
identity, and political integration - dictatorships, violence, genocides - economy and society - 
and women and gender history. Focus within the category ‘knowledge’ is given to history of 
science, culture of science, and societies of science - teacher education and subject didactics - 
historical and cultural studies on e-research and teaching. The last category ‘media’ focuses 
on text and edition - material culture - and visual and media history of culture. 
Interfacultary research platforms are:30 
• Repositioning of women’s and gender history 
• Center for Interdisciplinary Research and Documentation of Inner and South Asian 
Cultural History 
• Vienna Institute for Archaeological Sciences 
• Wiener Osteuropaforum 
• Theory and Practice of Subject Didactics/Teaching Methodologies 
• Cognitive Science 
• Research platform Elfriede Jelinek: texts - contexts - perception 
The Directorates of Studies (Studienprogrammleitungen, SPL) at the University are 
responsible for the studies, each comprising different study programmes. Following 
Directorates of Studies are assigned to the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies: SPL 6: 
Prehistoric and historical archaeology, egyptology and Jewish studies, SPL 7: History, SPL 8: 
Art history and European ethnology, SPL 9: Classical studies, and SPL 41: Doctoral 
programme of historical and cultural studies. The SPL 7 History e.g. includes all history 
studies/lectures also the ones mainly conducted by the Department of Economic and Social 
History (see profile of the department). The total number of students enrolled in the 
Directorates of Studies SPL 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the recent years is as follows: 
                                                 
29 Universität Wien, Historisch-Kulturwissenschaftliche Fakultät, Forschungsschwerpunkte (2013) 
http://hist-kult.univie.ac.at/forschungsschwerpunkte/,  Accessed: 01.12.2013 
30 Universität Wien, Historisch-Kulturwissenschaftliche Fakultät, Interfakultäre Forschungsplattformen (2013) 
http://hist-kult.univie.ac.at/forschung/forschungsplattformen/,  Accessed: 01.12.2013 
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Figure 6: SPL at the faculty - Student development31 (st = summer term, wt = winter term) 
 
                                                 
31 Data extracted from pdf-files on student-statistics of the University of Vienna (per semester, from winter term 
2004 to winter term 2012 see Statistik detailliert Studierende WS04/05 - WS12/13). Pdf-files can be found at: 
Universität Wien, Studienservice und Lehrwesen, Studierendenstatistik (2013) 
http://studien-lehrwesen.univie.ac.at/informationen-und-downloads/datenanfragen/studstat/,  
Accessed: 01.12.2013 
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Figure 7: SPL 7 History - Student development32 (st = summer term, wt = winter term) 
 
Both graphics correspond to the general rise of student numbers at the university; student 
numbers at the faculty and the SPL 7 History have grown as well in the recent years. 
However, on closer examination it becomes apparent that especially the SPL 7 History 
attracted more students.  
 
 
                                                 
32 Data extracted from pdf-files on student-statistics of the University of Vienna (per semester, from winter term 
2004 to winter term 2012 see Statistik detailliert Studierende WS04/05 - WS12/13). Pdf-files can be found at: 
Universität Wien, Studienservice und Lehrwesen, Studierendenstatistik (2013) 
http://studien-lehrwesen.univie.ac.at/informationen-und-downloads/datenanfragen/studstat/, 
Accessed: 01.12.2013 
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3.3 Department of Economic and Social History 
3.3.1 Profile 
The Department of Economic and Social History was founded in 1922 and reopened in 1959. 
It is characterised by its unique scientific and institutional position within its discipline:  it is 
the only department in Austria where economic and social history is rooted in a 
historical/cultural faculty. Other departments of economic and social history are located in 
economic and social science faculties.  
The academic profile of the department is marked by multidisciplinarity and 
interdisciplinarity. Research and teaching are integrated within the fields of social history, 
economic history and cultural history and in addition within the didactics of history. The 
Department of Economic and Social History holds a special position within the Faculty of 
Historical and Cultural Sciences due to its interdisciplinary character and its dissemination of 
socio-economic history. Research and teaching contribute to other parts of the university 
respectively academia, e.g. by being connected to the fields of history, social studies, and 
political education or by teaching tasks at the Faculty of Business, Economics and Statistics. 
By the nature of its discipline, research and teaching are also focusing on processes and 
development in a broader picture. Global history and interdependencies are becoming 
increasingly important in the understanding of socio-economic trends and developments, 
which - for the department - leads to close cooperation with other fields like area studies, 
geography, political science, and sociology.  
Teaching of the department is taking place within the undergraduate and graduate degree 
courses in history. Professors and lecturers contribute with general and specialised lectures in 
(European) socio-economic history and with an increasing focus on global socio-economic 
history. Further, staff members of the department are also involved in further and adult 
education.33  
 
 
                                                 
33University of Vienna, Department of Economic and Social History, Department profile (2013)  
http://wirtschaftsgeschichte.univie.ac.at/en/home/department-profile/, Accessed: 13.11.2013 
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3.3.2 Key numbers 
 
Table 12: Staff at the department34 
Full professors 5 
A.O. professors (‘associate professors’) 7 
University docents 12 
Assistant professors 1 
Assistants 5 
Employees in research projects and/or 
scientific programmes 
17 
Guest researchers 2 
Publication and documentation 3 
Total scientific staff 52 
Total administrative staff 5 
External Lecturers 53 
Total number of staff (22.11.2013): 57 (110) 
 
3.4 Professorship 
This paragraph wants to provide some key data on the overall development of professors and 
professorships at the University of Vienna. Some of the findings of these data will be of 
interest for the following chapters. Based on the statistical Austrian online-tool uni:data, 
following numbers could be gathered and edited concerning the development of the numbers 
of professors at the University of Vienna, unfortunately only from 2005 until 2011. As 
indicated before, the information is supplied without liability and with the purpose of 
examining an overall trend.  
 
                                                 
34 Data collected from departmental website and adjusted according to information of the department: 
University of Vienna, Department of Economic and Social History, Staff (2013) 
http://wirtschaftsgeschichte.univie.ac.at/en/staff/, Accessed: 22.11.2013 
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Current professorships at the Department of Economic and Social History35 
2005 Professorship Economic and Social History (Professur für Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialgeschichte) 
2007 Professorship International Economic History with special emphasis on Global History 
(Professur für internationale Wirtschaftsgeschichte mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der 
Globalgeschichte) 
2011 Professorship Economic and Social History (Professur für Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialgeschichte) 
2011 Professorship of Medieval Economic and Social History (Professur für Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialgeschichte des Mittelalters) 
2013 Professorship of Economic and Social History (Professur für Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialgeschichte) 
 
Number of full professors at the University of Vienna 
 
Figure 8: Full professors - Total number36  
                                                 
35 Universität Wien, Institut für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter (2013) 
http://wirtschaftsgeschichte.univie.ac.at/mitarbeiterinnen/wissenschaftliche-mitarbeiterinnen/, 
Accessed: 22.11.2013 
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Prior figure displays the total number of full professors. As the graph shows, the number of 
professors has grown substantially in the recent years. This was mainly because additional 
funds were granted which the university used in order to establish new professorships. 
However, in consideration of the size and the overall growth of the university, the number of 
full professors remains relatively low.  
 
 
Figure 9: Full professors - Length of employment37 
 
This figure shows the total number of full professors, divided into unlimited employments 
(regular professors according to the appointment law § 98, UG) and limited employments. 
Basically, the 5-year limitation applies to professors who have absolved the shortened 
                                                                                                                                                        
36 Full professors - Total number, own Excel table, data collected at:  
https://oravm13.noc-science.at/apex/f?p=103:36, Accessed: 13.11.2013 
=> Auswertungen => Statistisches Taschenbuch => Personal => 5-2 ProfessorInnen sowie wiss- und künstl- 
MitarbeiterInnen nach Universitäten (Universität Wien) 
37 Full professors - Length of employment, own Excel table, data collected at:  
https://oravm13.noc-science.at/apex/f?p=103:36, Accessed: 13.11.2013 
=> Auswertungen => Gender Monitoring => Personal Universitäten => Personal nach Verwendung (Universität 
Wien) 
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appointment procedure (§ 99, UG) whereas the limitation of 6 years refers to professors who 
have been recruited in a one-time initiative (§ 99, par. 3, UG)  
 
Appointments at the University of Vienna 
 
 
Figure 10: Appointments - Total number38  
This figure shows the total number of appointments beginning from 2006. The overall number 
of appointments is declining, possibly 1) because additional funds for the creation of new 
professorships are now coming to an end 2) because the generation change (re-staffing 
professorships) is weakened (see following chapters for more information). 
                                                 
38 Appointments - Total number, own Excel table, data collected at:  
https://oravm13.noc-science.at/apex/f?p=103:36, Accessed: 13.11.2013 
=> Auswertungen => Bologna Monitoring => Universitäten => Berufungen an die Universität (Universität 
Wien) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total 157 101 101 107 117 108 66
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Figure 11: Appointments - Origin39 
 
This figure shows the origin of the professors. Appointments from the University of Vienna 
are low compared to external appointments. Data for 2007 until 2009 were not available. The 
high number of 34 appointments is probably due to the one-time possibility of recruiting a.O. 
professors (see appointment law § 99, par. 3 of the UG and the following chapters). Most of 
the appointments are from the European countries (with a substantial number from Germany).  
 
In this chapter we have presented our case by delivering some background information and 
key data. We could see e.g. that the University of Vienna is growing continuously concerning 
students and staffs. This growth is also displayed by the increasing number of professorships. 
Another aspect refers to a high number of appointments from outside Austria. With having 
these few examples in mind let us now proceed to the next chapter in order to examine 
professorial recruitment more in-depth.  
                                                 
39 Appointments - Origin, own Excel table, data collected at:  
https://oravm13.noc-science.at/apex/f?p=103:36, Accessed: 13.11.2013 
=> Auswertungen => Bologna Monitoring => Universitäten => Berufungen an die Universität (Universität 
Wien) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
own university 6 16 34 11
other universities (A) 17 25 19 22 13 15 9
EU (incl. D) 101 64 71 71 74 43 36
other countries 33 12 11 14 14 16 10
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4 CHARACTERISING PROFESSORIAL 
RECRUITMENT AT THE UNIVERSITY 
OF VIENNA 
 
This chapter explores the professorial recruitment at the University of Vienna from the 
perspective of the Department of Economic and Social History within the boundaries of the 
Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies.40  
Our first section deals with the regulatory framework and the determination of formal power 
authority in the professorial recruitment. Main emphasis in the beginning is given to the 
Universities Act 2002 and the Amendment 2009. Here we will introduce the legal framework, 
the appointment procedure for university professors according to the university laws, 
concluding with some comments and additional aspects. Finally, we will examine how the 
legal dimension has been translated via the Organisational Plan 2004 of the University of 
Vienna, and explore the power balances between executive structure and department. In so 
doing, we will find out under which circumstances the appointment procedure (recruitment 
cycle) will ‘take off’.  
In the second section - our preliminary level - we are concerned with the creation and general 
funding situation of professorships. In this respect we have to discuss the development 
planning of the university and the Development Plan 2015 in order to understand the overall 
strategies. A passage on leeway and dynamics in the creation process of professorships 
between department and executive structure follows afterwards. Eventually, we will enter the 
pre-phase of the official appointment procedure of the University of Vienna, the Professorial 
Appointment Procedure.  
The third section which is our intermediate level explores mostly the search and selection 
processes of future professors at the University of Vienna. Here we will introduce the 
Professorial Appointment Procedure by providing background information and defining the 
different stages of the procedure. We will focus on the interaction between the relevant 
                                                 
40 Usually, all facts refer to the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies and the Department of Economic and 
Social History unless mentioned differently. 
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academic actors in the search and selection processes mostly from the perspective of our 
department. Conclusively, brief comments on the role of the administrative actors will round 
off this level.  
The fourth section represents our final level. Here we are dealing with the post-phase of the 
Professorial Appointment Procedure and bring the exploration of the appointment procedure 
(recruitment cycle) to an end. In so doing, we will also discuss the employment conditions 
before proceeding to the next chapter. 
 
4.1 Regulatory framework: formal power authority 
We have identified this level as regulatory framework which displays the legal basis of the 
recruitment process not only at the University of Vienna/Department of Economic and Social 
History but in general at Austrian public universities. Our questions are: which laws constitute 
the recruitment process? And what are the formal power sources?  In this respect, we shall 
first take a closer look on the legal basis as defined by the UG 2002 with the amendment UG 
2009 (UG)41 including the legal setup of the appointment laws, and followed by some related 
comments and additional legal aspects regarding the appointment procedure. In the second 
paragraph we will discuss the Organisational Plan 2004 especially with focus on executive 
structure and department in the light of a university-specific appointment procedure. In this 
way we will lay the groundwork for a ‘recruitment cycle’ of candidates, before dealing with 
this ‘recruitment cycle’ more in-depth in the following three levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 NB: When refereeing to the Universities Act 2002 (Universitätsgesetz 2002, abbreviated: UG 2002) including 
the changes of the Amendment 2009 (Universitätsrechtsänderungsgesetz 2009, abbreviated: UG 2009), only the 
abbreviation ‘UG’ (Universitätsgesetz) will be used, unless we are referring explicitly to one of them. 
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4.1.1 Professorial recruitment under the Universities Act 2002 and 
the Amendment 2009 
The appointment procedure for university professors42 
The implementation of the law occurred gradually; most of the laws became active in October 
2002 or January 2004. Some of the main changes in the new university law are that 
universities are now legal entities under Austrian public law (§ 4, UG), not dependent on 
direct ministerial influence and orders, and able to decide on their own statutes (§ 5, UG). 
They are mainly public funded by the state/ministry through performance agreements (§ 12, 
UG). 
The legal requirements for the appointment procedure are described in chapter 3 of the UG. 
While § 97 concerns more the nature of university professors, § 98 is determining the regular 
appointment procedure and § 99 the shortened appointment procedure of university 
professors. The following passages presented here have been paraphrased on the basis of the 
official German version and partly on the English translation of the UG concerning § 98 
(Appointment Procedure for University Professors) and § 99 (Shortened Appointment 
Procedure for University Professors). 
§ 98 constitutes the official and regular appointment procedure for university professors. A 
position that is to be filled on permanent basis has to be specified by the development plan. 
(par. 1) The announcement of the positions has to be advertised by the rectorate, nationally 
and internationally. Candidates who have not applied actively may also be included after 
having agreed on this. (par. 2) It is up to the professorial members of the senate to appoint two 
                                                 
42 In order to ensure readability of following pages, quotes from the university law have been kept as simple as 
possible. The same applies to the selection of relevant paragraphs; aim has been to focus on the most relevant 
ones for an appropriate introduction since we will face many of the legal aspects again when examining e.g. 
organisational plan or the Professorial Appointment Procedure at the University of Vienna (see 4.3.1). In this 
way we avoid double entries and have a more focused perspective.  
Our source of reference for the UG 2002 - as already pointed out earlier - is the legal information system of the 
Austrian Federal Chancellery which is updated daily and thus includes also the amendments of the UG 2009:  
Austrian Federal Chancellery (2013) Bundesrecht konsolidiert: Gesamte Rechtsvorschrift für Universitätsgesetz 
2002, Fassung vom 26.11.2013 (German version of the Universities Act 2002 incl. Amendment 2009) 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20002128, 
Accessed: 26.11.2013 
In addition, there is an English translation of the Universities Act 2002 existing which is quite incomplete and 
not up-to-date, only cited with regards to parts of the appointment paragraphs after being modified and updated:  
Austrian Federal Chancellery (2013) Austrian laws: Federal Act on the Organisation of Universities and their 
Studies (Universities Act 2002) (English version of the Universities Act 2002, NB: incomplete, does not include 
the amendment 2009) 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_2002_1_120/ERV_2002_1_120.pdf, Accessed: 26.11.2013 
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assessors, nominated by professors in the respective department, including at least one 
external assessor. The professorial members of the senate can also delegate this task to the 
professors of the respective department or a subject-related department. The rector can 
appoint an additional assessor. (par. 3) The senate has to appoint an authorised appointment 
committee. Professors have to represent more than half of the members, students at least one. 
(par. 4) The appointment committee has to prove whether the applications meet the 
requirements or not, and dismiss those which are not meeting the requirements. The 
remaining applications are to be transferred to the assessors who have to assess the candidates 
according to the announced position. (par. 5) The rector has to give suitable candidates the 
opportunity to introduce themselves to the departments and subject-related departments. (par. 
6) The appointment committee creates a shortlist of three most suitable candidates (terna-
list43) based on the assessments and comments. If the list does not include three candidates it 
is has to be justified. (par. 7) The rector then selects a candidate from the shortlist or sends it 
back to the appointment committee, if the candidates are not suitable. (par.8) Before initiating 
appointment negotiations the rector has to notify the Working Group on Equal Opportunities 
of his/her decision. The working group has the right to object the decision; the arbitration 
commission approves/rejects this objection (par.9) If the arbitration commission rejects the 
objection, the rector initiates appointment negotiations, if not, a new selection decision has to 
be made. (par. 11) After successful negotiations the professors receives a venia docendi44 for 
his/her subject, (par. 12) the venia docendi of a professor with limited contracts expires when 
the employment contract ends. (par. 13) 
§ 99 constitutes the shortened appointment procedure for university professors. The 
paragraphs 1, and 3 to 8 of the regular § 98 procedure do not apply, if the professor is to be 
appointed for a period up to five years. The prolongation of the appointment can only be 
granted after having completed the regular appointment procedure according to § 98. (par. 1) 
The rector has to appoint the candidate after consulting the professors of the respective 
subject area (par. 2) The rectorate can enact an ordinance - which needs the approval of the 
university board - and create one time only university professor-positions for a period of not 
more than six years, open only to university docents according to § 94 par. 2 Z 2. The number 
can comprise 20 % of the positions according to § 122 par. 2 Z 4. § 98 par. 1 to 8 do not 
apply. The positions shall be announced in the newsletter of the university. The rector has to 
                                                 
43 A list containing three names/candidates. 
44 A license to teach. 
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staff the positions based on a selection process which meets international competitive 
standards. An unlimited prolongation of the appointment by the rector is only admissible after 
a quality assessment. This assessment measures the quality of scientific performances and 
teaching performances of the last five years. The quality assessment has to be based on 
international competitive standards. Application on prolongation can be filed after having 
completed the fifth year. (par. 3) 
 
Comments and additional aspects of the appointment procedure 
With regards to the former university law (UOG 1993) an important change in the 
appointment procedure has been the suspension of ministerial influence. The rector/ate and 
senate, and not the particular faculty, are now conducting the appointment procedure 
formally. Despite that, the appointment procedure consists now of a standard procedure (§ 98, 
UG) and a shortened one (§ 99, UG).  (Novak 2007) The UG 2009 has revised both 
procedures due to emerging problems in handling them. Concerning the § 98 procedure, four 
assessors were mandatory formerly, now there are two. In the shortened § 99 procedure the 
duration of professorships was extended from two to now five years. In addition, the one-time 
creation of professorships - only open to university docents and for a period of not more than 
six years (§ 99 par. 3, UG) - was introduced. (Novak 2010) 
Another aspect that should be considered here especially is the new employment status of 
university professors. They have become employees who sign private job contracts with the 
university, and thus are no longer civil servants. In this respect the transition period has 
brought along some problems, e.g. concerning the completion of old appointment procedures 
and establishing new ones; § 97 - § 99 applied to university professors and appointment 
procedures from 01.01.2004. Appointment procedures before that date had to be finished 
based on former statutes but with new legal status for the newly appointed professor. This 
would have had been regulated in the Salaried Employees Act (as pointed out in § 108 par. 1, 
UG) but not until the Collective Agreement came into effect. Despite that, civil servant 
university professors would keep their legal status. (Perthold-Stoitzner 2009) 
In the now following pages, our main focus lies on the regular appointment procedure (based 
on § 98, UG) and its occurrence in the Professorial Appointment Procedure of the University 
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of Vienna since certain legal and formal steps are excluded in the shortened appointment 
procedure. As a consequence of the overall topic, we will not exclude completely the 
shortened procedure from our discussion. However, referring to the shortened procedure will 
only occur occasionally.  
When discussing the Professorial Appointment Procedure more in-depth, we will eventually 
see that legal principles for appointment procedures are defined by university law but with the 
possibility for the universities of adjusting and modifying them with regards to their 
organisational structure. It is important to keep in mind that the appointment procedures can 
be developed individually on the basis of the UG, and hence can be different from university 
to university and their organisational outcome. In our case it is therefore necessary to focus on 
the Organisational Plan 2004 of the University of Vienna. 
 
4.1.2 Defining formal power in the university 
The Organisational plan 2004
45
 
With an organisational plan the University of Vienna has established its own developed 
organisational structure for the first time. The Organisational Plan 2004 (OG 2004) and the 
reorganisation of the university became active gradually e.g. concerning the University 
Offices in January 2004 and with regards to the internal structure (Binnenstruktur) of the 
faculties in January 2005. Up to that date the department/institute structure was organised 
according to the UOG 1993. After being formally approved, the OG 2004 has been revised 
slightly several times. A major revision of the OG 2004 became active through the new OG 
2013 which is active since January 2013.  
Although many legal aspects are determined by the UG, it grants organisational autonomy for 
the respective university as well. This includes the definition of the organisational plan, the 
development plan and the university statutes.  Direct ministerial interference has been 
abolished and replaced by performance agreements (Leistungsvereinbarung) between 
                                                 
45
 NB: The document of relevance for our case is the Organisational Plan 2004 (OG 2004) in the version of 
November 2006 which includes the latest adjustments of that plan. The new Organisational Plan 2013 (OG 2013) 
which became active in January 2013 will not be of interest for us unless mentioned explicitly. 
Organisational Plan 2004 => Universität Wien, Mitteilungsblatt, Organisationsplan 2004 (2013) 
http://www.univie.ac.at/mtbl02/, Accessed: 23.11.2013 
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university and state. Ensuring this overall agreement is done by internal university 
negotiations on target agreements (Zielvereinbarung), e.g. between rectorate and 
organisational units. (OG according to UG 2002: 7)46 Major change concerns the restructuring 
and internal organisation of the university. There is now a leadership level (Leitungsebene) 
and a level of organisational units (Ebene von Organisationseinheiten). 
• Leadership level 
The legal status of the leadership level - which includes the highest bodies university board, 
senate, rector/ate - is determined in the UG and not in the OG 2004. These bodies are 
responsible for final implementation and approval of the organisational plan and development 
plan. Of specific interest for our case are senate and rector/ate. The senate is a body on the 
highest level where the participation rights of the university members are concentrated. Only 
the senate can pass its competences to other collegial bodies (Kollegialorgane) which can 
decide in its name. Despite that, the senate makes substantial contributions to appointment 
procedures. Rector and rectorate (rector + four vice rectors) are two sides of the same coin 
and represent one of the highest bodies in university. Especially the rector plays a crucial role 
in the appointment procedure regarding control, selection and negotiation. (OG according to 
UG 2002: 4-5) 
• Faculties and centres 
The faculties are the organisational units of the university with research and teaching 
objectives (§ 3 of OG 2004); centres are also organisational units but with special tasks, and 
being more focused on either research or teaching (§ 4 of OG 2004). With the reorganisation, 
faculties and centres - with regards to their structure and organisation - were newly 
established or carried over. They are perceived as optimal partners in the negations on target 
agreements (OG according to UG 2002: 7). The faculties and centres are led by the dean. One 
of their major tasks is elaborating suggestions on internal structure and development plan of 
the faculty and the distribution of resources.  
 
 
                                                 
46 Universität Wien, Der Organisationsplan 2004 nach UG 2002 (2004) 
http://public.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/public/pdf/organisationsplanUG2002.pdf, Accessed: 23.11.2013 
68 
 
• Internal structure of faculties 
The new internal structure was constructed based on suggestions by the deans according to 
evaluations and suggestions of faculty scientists and the former faculty structure, and a 
statement of the faculty conference. Afterwards, rector/ate and deans have determined the 
internal structure of the faculties in negotiations on target agreements. It was up to the 
faculties to decide on the names of their sub-units (institute, division, working groups, subject 
areas, departments, etc.) In general, all faculties - as well as the Faculty of Historical and 
Cultural Sciences - decided to choose the former German description Institut.47 The heads of 
the sub-units are appointed by the dean after consultation of the scientific members of the 
particular sub-unit. (OG according to UG 2002, p. 15) 
 
Executive structure and Department 
From the perspective of the department - in simplified terms and concerning the appointment 
procedure - we have to perceive the executive structure of the university as rector/ate and the 
faculty/dean. 
Concerning the power balance within the university, the University of Vienna was long time 
characterised by a high (organisational) fragmentation with regards to its departments. 
(Winckler 2003) In this situation the departments were strong and the faculties weak. On the 
surface, the new law presents a kind of a new era for several reasons. Firstly, a substantial 
authority shift from ministry to rector/ate took place - also with regards to the appointment 
procedure - which means a broader room to manoeuvre at least for the rector/ate. (see laws of 
the UG and OG) Secondly, a two-level system has been established with university leadership 
and the faculties, and a coherent university strategy introduced in contrast to the single 
strategies of the departments. Tensions within this occur through the different socialisation of 
old members of the university (INT-5) which partly have resentments against new trends and 
developments (e.g. evaluation culture, technical developments, management aspects, etc.). 
                                                 
47 In English ‘department’; actually the English word ‘institute’ would refer to the German description Institut as 
well. However, the official translation and description in English - at least in our specific case - is ‘department’. 
For more information see the archive of the former university online magazine about the internal structure: 
Universität Wien, Archiv der Online Zeitung Uni Wien - Binnenstruktur der Universität (2004) 
http://www.dieuniversitaet-online.at/beitraege/news/binnenstruktur-der-universitat-wien/10/neste/311.html, 
Accessed: 23.11.2013 
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(INT-10) Thus, in the beginnings of the transition period, “when the new law was introduced 
and began to gain traction, it was possible and common practice to limit the impacts of new 
law, not legally but in an interpretative sense.” (INT-9, own translation) However, this period 
of just perceiving the constraints but not the possibilities changed due to the fact that 
constantly old members retired. (INT-9) 
When it comes to the power balance between department and faculty, we have to bear in mind 
that departments never had formal rights. (INT-7) The departments - including the 
Department of Economic and Social History - are not powerful in a formal sense. They are a 
sub-unit of the faculty and are deprived of own legal status. Formal power centre is the dean 
of the faculty (INT-8) who can be a powerful actor. (INT-11) So basically tensions at the 
bottom are taking place in the faculty, and it is up to the faculty to handle this. (INT-5) 
Therefore, the strength and weakness of departments is also dependent on the power of the 
dean (INT-7) and how he/she balances and acts within this field. The faculties have 
undergone a different development in this respect. (INT-7) The Faculty of Historical and 
Cultural Studies was characterised by autonomous departments which had a lot of room to 
manoeuvre. They were autonomous because of their overall heterogeneity and their 
consequent fragmentation. De jure, the faculty was always powerful, but when the structure 
was heterogenic - like in the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies - the departments were 
powerful (in contrast to e.g. the Faculty of Law which was quite homogeneous). (INT-7) An 
issue that is related to this fragmented structure of the university is referring to the 
specialisations of departments and the professorships. Appointments at that time were made 
because of previous acquaintance and not based on a coherent profile/strategy which presents 
an important factor concerning the fragmentation of the university. (INT-9) 
In conclusion, the Department of Economic and Social History is not powerful in a formal 
sense. However, it has informal power and is an important initiator in university strategies. 
An advantage and a positive factor in this respect is the small size of the department when it 
comes to the coherent articulation of departmental interests towards faculty and university. 
(INT-10) At the point of intersection between department and faculty/rector/ate is the head of 
department. The role of the head e.g. is characterised by being a coordinator and a moderator 
for all issues and problems within the department. Informal power is based on the fact that 
this position is an important interface for dean and rector at the departmental level. The head 
has more access to information and is involved in the preparation of decisions. Generally the 
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head communicates and reports to higher hierarchies on the mood within the department. 
(INT-8) The department itself is characterised by its direct democratic tradition, e.g. once a 
week there is a meeting of scientific staff taking place (jour fixe), where normally all 
participate. (INT-8) Several respondents have confirmed that the jour fixe is working well. As 
a consequence, consensual opinion-forming and communication are and have been good for 
staffing vacant positions. (INT-4) 
So how is this opinion-forming process articulated when it comes to the creation of new 
professorships? In this section we have introduced the legal basis of the university in general 
and the recruitment process in particular. We have explored how power is balanced internally 
besides ‘formalities’ within faculties and the Faculty of Historical and Cultural 
Studies/Department of Economic and Social History. These dynamics are providing important 
information on the circumstances under which new professorships are installed. But first we 
have to take a closer look on how positions are actually created and funded; in general, and 
from the perspective of our department. As we will see in the following, organisational 
autonomy and the aim of having a coherent strategy on the scientific profile is expressed by 
development planning and eventually articulated and registered in the Development Plan 
2015.   
 
4.2 Preliminary level: creation and funding 
In this section we are discussing the preliminary level of our recruitment process. In so doing, 
we explore the underlying reasons of creation, and eventually pose the questions: how is a 
position created? And how is it funded? Structurally, this section is divided into information 
and findings on development planning and the Development Plan 2015, the possibilities and 
dynamics in the creation process, and the pre-phase of the Professorial Appointment 
Procedure. In conclusion - before focusing on the actual appointment procedure - it is first 
necessary to elaborate how positions are defined and created, and especially by whom.  
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4.2.1 Development planning and the Development Plan 2015 
According to the UG, universities have to make an important contribution to society and fulfil 
certain tasks in teaching and learning within the boundaries of instruction-freedom and 
university autonomy. In order to do this efficiently, there has been a change from ministerial 
decrees to performance-oriented agreements. Performance agreements are an instrument 
which should measure success and progress in negotiation between ministry and the 
university. Based on these measurements resources are distributed and budgets defined for a 
period of three years (the current period is 2013-2015). While performance agreements are 
negotiated between leadership level and ministry, the internal achievement of specified 
objectives is written down and negotiated between rector/ate and organisational units in target 
agreements. This is followed by particular internal negotiations on achievement between 
organisational units (faculties/centres) and sub-units (departments), and sub-units and 
members. Based on the target agreements, budgets and resources are distributed, the methods 
of how achieving the targets are up to the organisational units. (OG according to UG 2002: 7) 
Target agreements are defined in the rolling development plan of the university. Both 
agreement and plan are an important indicator for results and thus an important instrument for 
the performance assessment of the university. Development planning outlines the principles 
for future development of the university and how strategies are being implemented. Central 
objectives are to define principles in teaching and research which especially are 
improvements in teaching, defining a research profile with focus areas, and the dedication of 
professorships. Development planning has been constantly revised since 2004 and has been 
established in a complex top-down and bottom-up procedure (Winckler 2003) and in 
cooperation with all members of the universities via the organisational units/faculties and 
centres.  
After approval by the leadership level, the university could present the first development 
plan48 in 2005 which was the first documented overall strategy of the university. The current 
plan is the Development Plan 2015, a 112 page long document which has been approved in 
January 2012.49 This plan was the basis for the performance agreement between ministry and 
                                                 
48 For more information about the process of development planning see: 
Universität Wien,  Prozess der Entwicklungsplanung (2013) 
http://rektorat.univie.ac.at/entwicklungsplan/prozess-der-entwicklungsplanung/, Accessed: 27.11.2013 
49 Please note - also with regards to following citations - that the German version of the Development Plan 2015 
was used here: Universität Wien, Entwicklungsplan 2015 (2013) 
http://public.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/public/pdf/Entwicklungsplan_interaktiv.pdf, Access: 23.11.2013 
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university of the period 2013-2015. The development plan is mandatory and cannot be 
changed fundamentally; only small adjustments are possible. (INT-4) Special emphasis in the 
plan is given to strengthening and shaping the scientific research profile of the university in 
which appointments will play a crucial role. (Entwicklungsplan 2015: 22) Consequently, a 
major part of the development plan is concerned with faculty focus areas and the subject 
dedication of professorships. (ibid: 53-109) 
  
4.2.2 Leeway and dynamics in the creation process 
From the point of view of the department, there are two constraints occurring in the personal 
policy of professorships. One constraint is given by tradition, i.e. a major part of appointments 
is re-staffing these vacant positions. It is only possible to change these positions gradually but 
there is a strong will on all levels to change them. Another constraint is given by financial 
restrictions i.e. extension is only possible with external funds. (INT-8)  
The rise of the overall number of professorships at the university was due to an increase of 
federal revenues in the recent years. These additional revenues in a large part were used for 
funding new professorships. (INT-5) Related to this occurrence is the paragraph § 99, par. 3 
which enabled the university to create 29 new professorships in 2011.50 However, this period 
where additional funds were available will be different from the time that will follow. (INT-5)  
Usually, staff positions are assigned to the faculty. After the UG was introduced it was 
necessary to work on the profiles of the professorships of our faculty with defined names and 
structures. The underlying reason was to create a scientific profile that would allow finding a 
candidate who matches the scientific requirements (INT-9), an issue that will be of 
importance when discussing the effects of internal appointments. According to the subject 
dedication of professorships (Fachliche Widmung der Professur) in the Development Plan 
2015, the general possibilities for the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies in 
                                                 
50 These posts are initially limited to six years and were available for a.O. professors (in the law § 99, par. 3 of 
the UG described as university docents). For more information see the performance report of 2011: 30: 
Universität Wien, Leistungsbericht und Wissensbilanz (2011) 
http://public.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/public/various/Leistungsbericht_WiBi_2011_interaktiv.pdf, 
Accessed: 23.11.2013 
For the sake of completeness, the model of endowed professorships should be mentioned here as well since this 
might be of growing relevance at the University of Vienna/Austrian universities in the years to come. These 
professorships are usually for a limited period of time and with a start-up funding. After the resources have been 
used the university can consider taking over the professorship. 
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establishing professorships are by a) following vacancy of a professorship at the faculty b) 
funding via a vacant professorship at the faculty c) funding via vacant academic positions at 
the faculty. Despite that, it is considered to create one professorship in cooperation with 
another faculty. (Entwicklungsplan 2015: 67-70)  
This means in other words that the creation of complete new posts is not the rule. Creation is 
rather dependent on the creative ‘destructing’ of existing posts and on creating new ones out 
of them. Tensions occur due to the fact that faculties usually want more professorships while 
funds are limited. As a consequence, there is in fact limited room to manoeuvre in this matter. 
The strength of a dean for example can be measured according to his/her ability of moving 
professorships within the faculty. (INT-5) Another constraint at the moment is given by the 
fact that many posts at our faculty are occupied by a.O. professors51 which limit the room to 
manoeuvre with regards to staff planning and composition. Before the new law became active 
it was reasonable to write the habilitation/to become a.O. professor in order to obtain civil 
servant status before this status under the new law would not be granted any longer. (INT-10, 
INT-9, INT-4) 
Important in this respect is the internal university administration system, the personnel-point-
system: the position of a full professor cost 4 points, a.O. professor 3, post-doc 2, and prae-
doc 1 points. The personnel points of the Department of Economic and Social History 
amounts to over 100 points. The amount is determined which means that it is not changeable 
or only changeable in negotiations with the rector with regards to a new professorship (incl. 
extra prae-/post-doc positions). The dean of our faculty has the possibility to redistribute some 
points between the departments, “but de facto no one does it because it is very conflictual”. 
(INT-8, own translation) 
 
4.2.3 The pre-phase of the Professorial Appointment Procedure 
The room to manoeuvre for our department with regards to personnel policy occurs as 
follows: it is possible to make recommendations with regards to dissolving prae- and post-doc 
positions in benefit of professorships (or the other way round). However, this step is unlikely 
                                                 
51
 a.O. professors  (Außerordentlicher Professor) have civil servant status which is usually granted after writing 
the habilitation. However, this is an expiring function/title; as a consequence of the new law it is no longer 
granted. A.o. professors are members of the non-professorial group (Mittelbau). 
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because all existing positions fulfil a certain task. Practice in recent years was to re-staff 
vacant positions which de facto meant that there was no opportunity to create new 
professorships. It was only possible to change the profiles and to emphasise specific aspects 
which in the case of the department profile was an emphasis on global studies. (INT-8) 
These negotiations on the profile start in the department, and usually every scientific member 
is involved in the discussions.  Due to different status and seniority, some opinions are 
informally more important than other opinions but nevertheless it is tried to achieve 
consensus. These departmental discussions are followed by a meeting with the dean and the 
attempt of convincing him/her about the modifications on the profile. If it is approved by the 
dean, modifications would enter the negotiations on target agreements between faculty and 
rector/ate, and if approved by the rector/ate, it would be written down in the target agreements 
and eventually in the development plan. Thus, the profile of a professorship is dependent on 
scientific traditions of and the modifications by the department. In other words, a strong 
influence of the department occurs in these matters. (INT-8) 
So far we have elaborated how positions are created, and figured out possible rooms to 
manoeuvre within the overall university policy and within the Faculty of Historical and 
Cultural Studies. By having investigated how the internal faculty manoeuvring rooms occur 
with regards to the Department of Economic and Social History and their influence, it is now 
time to focus on their influence in the search and selection phase. By doing this, we have now 
approached our intermediate level and the Professorial Appointment Procedure at the 
University of Vienna.  
 
4.3 Intermediate level: search and selection 
This section describes our intermediate level and deals with the search and selection 
mechanisms in the recruitment process. The questions of interest are: How is the position 
announced? Who are the possible candidates? How is selection taking place and under what 
aspects is it executed? Who are the relevant actors? And finally, how is authority (influence 
and power) dispersed? This section is about the Professorial Appointment Procedure at the 
University of Vienna with emphasis on the departmental point of view. Our main focus is to 
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explore how the university implemented the statutory provisions and how the relevant actors 
interact with each other. 
 
4.3.1 The Professorial Appointment Procedure at the University of 
Vienna 
Background information 
The Professorial Appointment Procedure is outlined by several university groups and 
websites of the University of Vienna, with slight differences in the formal description. In 
order to provide a better overview, information on the appointment procedure can be found as 
follows at the University’s websites:  
• Administrative implementation of appointment procedures52 
• Appointment procedure at the University of Vienna53  
• Chart Appointment Procedure54 
These documents/information are not presenting alternative versions of the appointment 
procedure, they are rather complementary. Nevertheless, our two relevant sources here are the 
official document ‘Appointment procedure at the University of Vienna’ and the chart 
‘Appointment procedure’. The document on the process description (which is five pages long) 
shall be presented here abbreviated but nevertheless detailed enough for analysis (for full 
German version see web-link below). Despite that, the chart on the appointment procedure 
will serve as an additional help by visualising the described phases and formal steps of the 
Professorial Appointment Procedure. 
                                                 
52 Administrative implementation of appointment procedures: 
Universität Wien, Neue Professuren an der Universität Wien, Administrative Durchführung von 
Berufungsverfahren (2013) 
http://neue-professuren.univie.ac.at/administratives-fuer-fakultaeten-und-zentren/berufungsverfahren/,  
Accessed: 23.11.2013 
53 Appointment procedure at the University of Vienna (German), official document, based on resolution by 
rectorate, source:  
Universität Wien, Berufungsverfahren an der Universität Wien (2013)  
https://berufungsverfahren.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/qualitaetssicherung/berufungsverfahren/Prozessbe
schreibung_Berufungsverfahren.pdf,  Accessed: 23.11.2013 
54 Chart Appointment Procedure: 
Universität Wien, Berufungsverfahren - Graphische Darstellung Ablauf Berufungsverfahren (2013) 
https://berufungsverfahren.univie.ac.at/home/?no_cache=1, Accessed: 23.11.2013 
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The different stages of the Professorial Appointment Procedure55 
I. Arrangement and overview 
Purpose of the first stage is structuring the whole procedure. Rectorate and faculty leadership 
are responsible for elaborating the profile on basis of the development plan, determining the 
relevant subject areas (i.e. it includes also determination of professors who can make 
suggestions for assessors), discussing process and documentation of the procedure (incl. time 
plan), considerations on communication paths between committee/rectorate/senate, discussing 
announcement and search (strategies, potential candidate pool), and discussing purpose as 
well as possibilities of external members in the committee.  
II. Announcement and search 
Purpose of the second stage is the announcement, potential search agents, (responsibility: 
rectorate, faculty leadership) and the presentation of a complete candidate list incl. actively 
searched candidates (responsibility: faculty leadership, committee). Announcements are made 
in international and subject-related newspapers/magazines. Active candidate search is made 
through international networks/partners/search agents. Documentation on the procedure by 
the faculty leadership and the committee has to include: information on profile, 
announcement text, time frame and frequency of announcement, description on active search, 
information on candidates. 
III. Appointment of committee and assessors 
Purpose of third stage is the appointment of the committee and assessors by the senate, as 
well as the appointment of an assessor by the rector. Suggestions for assessors are made by 
professors of the subject area. Despite that, suggestions for members of the committee are 
made by professors, non-professorial staff, and students. The senate appoints the committee, 
if possible with external members. Appropriate representation of women in the committee has 
to be considered. Assessors are appointed based on suggestions of professors of the subject 
area. The senate informs all members and assessors on their appointment and provides 
information about process and rules of the Professorial Appointment Procedure. The Working 
Group on Equal Opportunities receives information on composition of the committee; the 
rector is to be informed. Normally, the rector can appoint an external assessor (not member of 
                                                 
55The term ‘rectorate’ in the following pages refers to the responsible member of the rectorate according to the 
assignment of tasks.  
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the appointment committee) considering suggestions of professors of the subject area. Senate, 
assessors, and selectee are to be informed.  Documentation on the procedure by the committee 
has to include: senatorial notice on appointment of committee and assessors, appointment of 
assessor by the rector, information for the Working Group on Equal Opportunities. 
IV. Task of committee and assessment 
Purpose of the fourth stage is that the committee produces a pre-selection list and an 
invitation list. Invitations are sent by the committee/faculty leadership. If necessary, an active 
candidate search can be enabled. The committee creates a pre-selection of candidates, divided 
into different groups: not suitable candidates (group 3), limited suitable candidates (group 2), 
and suitable candidates (group 1). The assessors receive applications of suitable (group 1) and 
limited suitable candidates (group 2), and make well-founded suggestions with emphasis on 
group 1. Proposals for the hearings are made on basis of the assessments (invitation list). The 
Unit for Quality Assurance (UfQA) comments the invitation list, and makes a formal 
examination of the pre-selection list. The rectorate approves/complements pre-selection list 
and invitation list. Documentation on the procedure by the committee has to include: 
assessments of candidates, reasons for invitation list and excluded candidates.  
V. Hearings and appointment proposal 
Purpose of the fifth stage is to make an appointment proposal, and to submit documentation 
on the whole procedure to rectorate and UfQA. At this stage the presentation (hearings) of the 
candidates takes places. Relevant subject areas are invited. The committee makes an 
appointment proposal on basis of assessments and comments, considering presentation of and 
discussion with the candidates. Documentation on the procedure by the committee has to 
include: final report including overview of procedure, reasons for decisions on candidates 
(pre-selection, hearings, and appointment proposal), voting results, timetable, comment of the 
dean with regards to the procedure and the proposal.  
VI. Assessment and selection decision 
Purpose of the sixth stage is to open the appointment negotiations (responsibility: rector). The 
personnel division makes a formal examination according to laws and rules. The UfQA gives 
an opinion in terms of content. After consulting the rectorate, the rector makes a general 
examination of the procedure, and decides whether to approve or to reject the appointment 
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proposal. Both senate and faculty are to be informed in this matter. Documentation on the 
procedure has to include: formal examination of procedure (by the personnel division), 
contentual statement concerning appointment proposal (by the UfQA), and potential 
additional assessments (by the rectorate).  
 
According to our sources and this first examination, following actors have been identified in 
the Professorial Appointment Procedure; basically, we can split them into two categories: 
 
Table 13: Group 1 - Academic actors 
Group 1: 
 
• Department/Subject area (Fachbereich) 
• Faculty/Centre, Dean (Fakultät/Zentrum, Dekan/Zentrumsleiter) 
• Rector/ate (Rektor/at) 
• Senate (Senat) 
• Appointment committee (Berufungskommission) 
o University professors (Universitätsprofessoren) 
o Non-professorial staff (Mittelbau) 
o Student(s) (Studenten) 
• Assessors (GutachterInnen), appointed by senate and/or rector 
• Candidates (Berufungskandidaten) 
 
• Working Group on Equal Opportunities (AK Gleichbehandlungsfragen) 
• Arbitration Commission (Schiedskommission) 
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Table 14: Group 2 - Administrative actors 
Group 2: 
 
• Unit for Quality Assurance, UfQA (Besondere Einrichtung für Qualitätssicherung, 
BEfQS) 
• Human Resources and Gender Equality (DLE Personalwesen und Frauenförderung) 
• Professors' Appointment Consulting Service (Stabstelle Berufungsservice) 
 
By looking at these groups it becomes apparent that we have divided them roughly into 
academic and administrative actors. Group 1 is mainly dealing with the search and selection 
process while Group 2 is more concerned with controlling the procedure according to formal 
rules and supporting the academic actors in this respect. Our main focus clearly lies more on 
the actors of Group 1 rather than Group 2, since we try to examine the leeway and dynamics 
that occur during the appointment procedure. In this respect we will exclude mostly the 
Working Group on Equal Opportunities as well as the Arbitration Commission from our 
discussion since these actors are mainly concerned with anti-discrimination issues according 
to their legal status. They and group 2 are rather attending control-actors than being actual 
decision making bodies. 
In the now following passage we are trying to explore the different academic actors of the 
Professorial Appointment Procedure according to the interplay between them from the 
perspective and influence of our department. However, it is more important to provide a 
reconstruction of the processes rather than producing a factual report.  
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department. (INT-8) Aim in the composition is not to be too narrow with regards to the 
discipline. It is important to involve the surroundings/other disciplines, which is discussed 
between the head of department and dean in the forefront. In this way it is also discussed 
which persons are available. (INT-4) The suggestions are sent to the professors of the senate 
and are usually approved by them but not always. One issue in this respect is that one assessor 
should be an external one, but ‘external’ is not defined by law. There is a different 
understanding of it, e.g. it could imply from another university, within Austria, or abroad.  
Sometimes the senate accepts the suggestions/definition and sometimes not, which leads to 
conflicts and rejection.  
• Composition 
As a rule, the committees are staffed as follows: professors have a majority with five 
members, non-professorial staff has three members, and students have one member. (INT-4) 
The chairman of the committee - who is most influential - is naturally a member of the 
department of the particular professorship. (INT-10) A problem in the compositions emerges 
because of the gender quota (40 % have to be female). Because of their limited number at the 
faculty it happens often that the same women are participating in the appointment committees. 
(INT-4)  
The question of who participates in the committee is generally of importance because 
different personalities and attitudes have a distinct influence on the decision. Some people are 
more active and more convincing than others, and as a consequence more influential. (INT-
11, INT-12) For example, not everyone studies or can study the documents/applications 
intensively i.e. some are well informed while others are not, and thus have better/poorer 
arguments. This leads sometimes to situations where “single opinions have more importance 
than others, more importance than actually allowed”. (INT-8, own translation) Despite that, 
members can sometimes be categorised according to national-oriented vs. international-
oriented. (INT-11) Since there have been many international appointments, more international 
professors are now sitting in the committee having a different attitude than locals. (INT-4) 
• Assessors 
In general, the reports of the (external) assessors are very important since the committee 
makes its decision based on the reports. As mentioned above, the department makes 
suggestions and determines the choice of the assessors in the forefront. (INT-4) An important 
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power factor with regards to the assessors is that the rector can nominate an additional extern 
assessor (nominated by the quality agency). This happens occasionally in order to control 
certain procedures. Usually, it does not happen if procedures are correct and consensual. But 
if the rector explores dissent and inconsistencies in the final reports, an additional external 
assessor is introduced. This is a possibility for the rector to get a better overview/an additional 
perspective of the procedure and to come to an own conclusion. However, this is not 
publicised internally and most likely did not happen in the department procedures. (INT-8)  
• Selection 
When it comes to the assessment of the candidates the habilitation is not that important 
anymore, and there is an increasing focus on external funding. (INT-10) Based on the 
applications, the committee makes a pre-selection of the candidates and ranks/divides them 
into three groups. These categories are sent to the assessors who assess the candidates. The 
candidates are then discussed in the committee on basis of assessments made by the assessors, 
and invited for a lecture/presentation.56 At this stage there are also discussions between the 
candidates and the appointment committee about different matters (e.g. staff, when to start, 
demands, etc.) Afterwards they are ranked (first, second, third) and this proposal is sent to the 
rector. (INT-11) Formally, these three positions are equal but informally/traditionally they are 
ranked, and the rector usually accepts this ranking.  But in this respect, professors now have 
less power because the rector still could choose anyone on the list to negotiate with and not 
necessarily the first position (despite that, he/she could also reject the complete list). (INT-8) 
• Appointments of the department 
In comparison to other appointment procedures at the university, the Department of Economic 
and Social History did not have to deal with major problems regarding their appointments. 
(INT-7) Minor limitations had to be made according to the demanded profile of the 
professorships which were not always carried over 1:1 into the development plan. 
Occasionally, the focus on global studies could have been even stronger. (INT-10) Another 
specific problem was that the application lists were imbalanced in terms of gender. There 
were not many (suitable) female applicants. (INT-8, INT-10) Despite that, the appointments 
of the department were assessed as being ‘harmonic’ which means that no intense disputes in 
the forefront or in the faculty groups took place. (INT-4) In addition, it is likely that no 
                                                 
56 In German described colloquially as Vorsingen, ‘to sing to somebody.’ 
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additional external assessors were introduced in the departmental procedures. (INT-8) The 
department did well in staffing the professorship i.e. all posts are staffed and feedback from 
other members/parts of the university was positive. (INT-12) 
 
Comments on the administrative actors of the appointment procedure 
The administrative actors who are supporting the appointment procedure in terms of quality 
and process are mainly the Human Resources and Gender Equality division, the UfQA and 
the Professors’ Appointment Consulting Service due to their cooperation between each other. 
The Human Resources and Gender Equality division is responsible for the formal 
examination of the appointment procedure and whether the procedure was conducted within 
the framework of existing legislation. The UfQA supports rector/ate, senate and committee in 
the assessment and evaluation of candidates. The UfQA fulfils certain service- and quality-
related aspects. On the one hand - as outlined in the process description - it provides various 
templates for procedure documents/documentation. On the other hand, it functions as a 
control actor in quality terms. It provides comments on invitation list, examination of pre-
selected candidates (groups one, two, three), and commenting the appointment proposal. 
Finally, it assesses candidates and can make suggestions for additional assessments. Hence, at 
this stage it is an important supporting actor for the rector/ate by providing information and 
evaluations on the particular appointment procedure. (INT-8) The Professors' Appointment 
Consulting Service gets active when the appointment committee is sending the terna-list to 
the rector/ate and prepares the appointment negotiations between candidates and rector/ate. 
(INT-6) The preparations include e.g. collecting and editing the necessary data of the 
candidate. Before the actual negotiations start the dean/faculty will be contacted and asked 
about possible contributions of the dean/faculty. On this basis, the rector/ate can propose an 
offer to the candidate concerning salary, demands, and equipment. (INT-6) Another important 
task of the service is the personal assistance of the candidates. This includes various issues, 
having the purpose of supporting the integration of candidates/appointees (e.g. apartment 
search, family related assistance, dual-career aspect). (INT-6) 
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4.4 Final level: employment conditions  
We have now come to our final level of our recruitment process. Structurally, we link tightly 
to the intermediate level and focus on the last stage of a (successful) recruitment cycle. In so 
doing, we are looking at the post-phase of the Professorial Appointment Procedure: Who is 
negotiating? And how do negotiations look like?  Finally, we deal with employment 
conditions and lead to our analysis and discussion chapter.  
The rector plays a special role in this section because he/she concludes the Professorial 
Appointment Procedure. Since this is by nature a sensitive topic, this paragraph does not 
include sensitive information on employment conditions of departmental professors (neither 
have these information been requested nor have they been revealed). As a consequence, 
following information are more related to negotiation dynamics and employment conditions 
in our faculty within the polity of the university; still, they have some impact on our 
department. As we have already mentioned we are more interested in the reconstruction and 
in getting an idea of the procedure rather than document past events.  
 
4.4.1 The post-phase of the Professorial Appointment Procedure 
• Appointment negotiations 
Usually, the rector begins to negotiate with number one on the list but in fact he/she does not 
have to. For the dean it is necessary to convince the rector and to show the will to provide 
equipment and support from the faculty if a specific candidate is favoured. If engagement is 
absent (incl. not providing equipment and extras), this is usually a signal for the rector that the 
respective candidate is not that important which means that these appointments are likely to 
fail. (INT-9)  
Thus, for successful negotiations it is of relevance that dean and rector agree between each 
other. Especially with regards to equipment and support the contribution by the dean/faculty 
is important; the rector can be helpful with respect to salaries and providing extras. (INT-9) 
Our department has no insight view or influence in the negotiations between rector and 
candidate except from granted extras for the professor that are passed to the department. 
(INT-8) 
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• Problems 
Failed or extended negotiations occurred because of disagreements (e.g. on salary, staff, 
equipment, etc.), if a rector did not accept the list, or if members of a committee have 
different opinion on the candidates. (INT-11) A problem that occurred in the past and that 
seemed to continue to a certain extent was that usually the ‘best’ candidate was wanted but i t 
was unlikely that he/she would agree. For example, apparently it occurred that candidates 
(mainly from Germany) wanted to strengthen their position at their home university but 
actually seemed to have had no intentions to come. (INT-6, INT-11) In other words, 
candidates only used the negotiations with the university to improve their situation (salary, 
equipment, etc.) at their home university. (INT-10) 
A related problem of the former recruitment practices was e.g. if the third candidate on the 
proposal was chosen ‘sloppy’ by the committee. For example, it occurred that proposal lists 
were created where the first two candidates were excellent candidates but very unlikely. Or 
negotiations with the first and second candidates took a long time, and eventually failed 
which meant that the third candidate almost had the post for sure; someone with an 
insufficient profile-match. Therefore it was sometimes better to call for new proposals, also 
because the candidate situation has changed. However, here it was again necessary to talk and 
to discuss with the related subject areas. (INT-7, INT-9) Consequently, appointments can be a 
time intensive matter. A department specific problem in this respect occurred due to the fact 
that one certain appointment negotiation took a long time (over one year). (INT-11) 
• Recruitment strategies 
The recruitment policy of the university was in former times characterised by internal/local57 
appointments and/or non-transparency. (INT-12) Recruitment in own circles - which was 
highly dependent on internal acquaintances - was the traditional career path i.e. it was quite 
common to stay at the university and climb up the academic career ladder. (INT-9) However, 
an active internationalisation strategy was pursued in the recent decade. (INT-4) 
Internationalisation - including international appointments - is an explicit policy of the 
university. (Entwicklungsplan 2015: 9) As a result, internal appointments have become - 
                                                 
57 At this point it is necessary to point out that the term ‘internal/local’ is not strictly limited to internal 
appointments. For example in our case it applies also to appointments within the disciplines (i.e. under 
circumstances also beyond university borders), an issue which will be discussed when looking at 
internationalisation and quality issues in our analysis. 
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although officially possible - very unlikely in the recent decade. (INT-4) Special attention is 
given when a.O. professors apply (INT-7) and since applications from internals are not 
‘welcome’, they are approved only in exceptional cases i.e. one has to be significantly better 
than other applicants. (INT-8) Due to this policy, resistance emerged at the level of non-
professorial staff who began to feel disadvantaged (INT-4, INT-9) and developed reservations 
against newcomers.58 (INT-1, INT-4, INT-8, INT-9)  
An important strategic instrument for the university presents the shortened appointment 
procedure. However, this procedure was too limited (short) before the UG 2009 and thus has 
been extended through this amendment. In simplified terms, the procedure takes place as 
follows: there is no appointment committee, the dean collects the applications and asks the 
professors of the related subject areas about their opinion. The dean forms an appointment 
proposal which will be sent to the rector. Both can, but do not have to appoint assessors; 
however, involvement of assessors is usually practice. An advantage of this instrument is that 
it is possible to appoint/headhunt candidates right after they receive important grants. On the 
other side it can prevent ‘good’ scientists to go abroad if they received an offer from other 
universities. (INT-7) Despite that, it is possible to convert short appointments to permanent 
positions after candidates have been undertaken the appointment procedure § 98 (INT-7). It is 
therefore also an opportunity for the university to look at candidates more precisely before 
they obtain a permanent position at the university. (INT-5) 
 
4.4.2 Employment conditions 
The old salary scheme was structured in fixed categories, teaching and exams for example 
were paid additionally. Now the salary for professors became negotiable, with ‘all-in-
contracts’ (e.g. including teaching) with performance-based incentives, i.e. loan adjustments 
and agreements on evaluation. (INT-6) By discussing employment conditions we want take 
up on an issue which has been introduced in our section on legal changes (regulatory 
framework): the change from civil-servant to employee status of future professors. Associated 
with this change was also the problem of bringing different legal and pension aspects with 
regards to the appointment procedure into accordance during the transition period. (INT-7) 
                                                 
58 This seems to be a problem which does not only apply to the department and the faculty, but to the whole 
university. 
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An issue which apparently continues to exist is the appointment of German candidates. Salary 
and pensions schemes of civil servants are different than in Germany (INT-12) and thus leads 
to some problems in the negotiations. (INT-6, INT-9) 
In general, the new (organisational) autonomy of the university led to more autonomy in 
financial matters as well. (INT-5) In combination with the transition from civil servant into 
employee status, a higher salary spectrum for professors became possible (INT-3, INT-8) also 
in comparison with Germany. (INT-9, INT-12) This led to competitive advantages in 
appointment negotiations in comparison e.g. to the universities of Zurich and Munich. (INT-
7) On the other hand the new minimum salary of professors was perceived as quite low. (INT-
3, INT-8) However, it seems that with regards to our department, the (local) average salary 
structure is taken into consideration before salary negotiations with new 
candidates/appointees are conducted. (INT-8) Nevertheless, due to this change a broader 
spectrum in terms of loans emerged which hence is characterised by non-transparency and 
limited knowledge about earnings of (other) professors in general and at the department. 
(INT-10, INT-12)  
 
After having explored the recruitment process and the Professorial Appointment Procedure at 
the university from the perspective of the department, it is now time to come to an overall 
assessment. Let us therefore analyse and discuss our findings more detailed in the next 
chapter. There we will bring in our variables and try to categorise and elaborate the 
development of the recruitment process with regards to our case.  
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5 ANALYSING PROFESSORIAL 
RECRUITMENT AT THE UNIVERSITY 
OF VIENNA 
 
This chapter represents our second analytic stage and is in fact our analysis and discussion of 
findings chapter. Here we will position and evaluate professorial recruitment according to our 
variables. In other words, this chapter is analysing and discussing our findings from the 
proceeded chapter by classifying them within the variables centralisation, formalisation and 
standardisation, and flexibility.  
Our overall question was how practices of institutional autonomy are changing with regards 
to the professorial recruitment. We have divided these questions into two sub-categories: what 
has changed formally and what has changed informally. Having these two sub-questions in 
mind, we will look at our variables and analyse and discuss the findings according to them. 
The idea behind this is to assess outcomes and effects of the professorial recruitment by 
focusing on the interaction between executive structure and department. 
The two general assumptions were as follows: university reforms lead to the emergence of an 
executive structure that would limit departmental influence severely. But on the other side the 
university is a bottom-heavy institution, and the executive structure is dependent on 
substantial impulses from the bottom.   
 
5.1 Centralisation  
This variable is connected to the question of authority, and distinguishes between formal and 
informal (dependant on personal authority rooted in expertise) authority. In order to assess 
the dispersion of authority, questions of interest are e.g. where decision making is taking 
place, which of the persons is in charge, or what the constraints are. 
The important question in our case is to estimate how authority is dispersed, by identifying 
relevant actors and their responsibility. Our specific questions are: where does decision-
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making take place? Who controls (human) resources? And who controls the recruitment 
process? 
 
5.1.1 Influence from a heavy bottom: departmental authority 
As our findings have shown the department still has substantial influence on the recruitment 
process. Defining and modifying (own) professorships is highly dependent on the input from 
the department. Despite that, suggestions on assessors and appointment committee are 
emerging mainly at the departmental level. This means that to a certain extent departmental 
influence on candidates is translated by the appointment committee via the senate. Even if it 
concerns the shortened appointment procedure, input originally emanates from the bottom 
after being requested by the dean and before sending it to the rector.  A reason for this 
bottom-heavy authority might be that superior authorities only have rejecting power, in 
practice 
“it is impossible for superior authorities to staff the commissions or nominate 
assessors without being suggested by the departments first. Thus, the departments 
have a broad manoeuvring with regards to decide on assessors and members of the 
committee.” (INT-8, own translation) 
 
5.1.2 Representation of interests and power centre: senate, 
appointment committee and assessors 
Senate, appointment committee and assessors together are the power centre when it comes to 
the search and selection phase of the recruitment process. Latter - committee and assessor - 
become especially important at the end of this phase. Reason is that the senate empowers the 
appointment committee; de jure the appointment committee will be the power centre then. 
Concerning the composition of the committee, professors are now more influential at the cost 
of non-professorial staff and students because they have a majority. The decision of the 
committee on candidate selection is usually approved if the selection process was consensual.  
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In terms of interest-representation, assessors can be closer either to the bottom or to the 
executive structure. In other words, dependent on the particular situation they can be an 
important instrument for both sides when it comes to decision-making in the appointment 
procedure. It seems that the growing emphasis on external and independent 
assessors/assessments acknowledges their suggestive power. They play an important role 
when making suggestions on candidates. And as long as there is consensus, the committee 
decides without interference in terms of that no additional assessors come into play. However, 
when decision-making and power is unbalanced it is common that additional assessors are 
introduced. Their reports on candidates are therefore of important evaluative power, and are 
actually more influential than just ‘tipping the scales’.59 (INT-6) 
 
5.1.3 Powerful intermediary: dean and faculty 
The faculty has formally power over the professorships but de facto internal faculty power 
balance is characterised by non-interference which means that traditional paths are continued. 
The same holds true for the faculty groups when it comes to the composition of committee 
and assessors: these (departmental) pre-decisions are usually approved. However, as we have 
seen the dean can be a powerful actor and it is usually also dependant on his/her notion 
whether the dean wants to perceive his/her role more creative or more administrative. In other 
words, the faculty has the opportunity to be either more perceived as executive structure or as 
an extension of departmental interests. This issue applies especially to the pre- and post 
phases of the appointment procedure.  
Here the influence is given by deciding on the profile of the professorship in negotiations with 
department and rector/ate. In addition, influence becomes visible when it comes to the final 
selection of a candidate. The dean can make an appointment more likely when signifying the 
rector that he/she favours the candidate. The reason why dean/faculty are or can be powerful 
at the endpoints of the appointment procedure is that posts and resources are assigned to the 
faculty. As a result, the dean can be supportive by providing them. Still, in this respect - and 
this refers to his/her intermediary role - the dean is dependent on impulses from the 
                                                 
59 An important fact in this respect is that the hearings of the candidates are rather assessments than getting to 
know each other. Final rankings/appointment proposals are made after having assessed the candidate more 
detailed. (see especially Novak 2007: 23) 
91 
 
department (scientific input, proposals and suggestions, traditional paths) and on the 
acknowledgement of the rector/ate (approval, cooperation).  
 
5.1.4 Counterbalance and strategic actor: the rector/ate 
A crucial change is that the last decision in the appointment procedure is now up to the rector 
and not the ministry any longer. Because the rector has more power and is ‘closer’ to the 
academic domain, he/she can be an important counterbalance in the appointment procedure. 
This applies e.g. to a coherent university strategy in contrast to particular department 
strategies. In the centre of this contest is e.g. the internationalisation and quality strategy. 
There has been a growing focus on internationalisation and appointing from abroad in 
contrast to appoint locally or only on suggestions of the academic domain. The rector 
possesses in addition two useful tools with the shortened appointment procedure and the 
higher salary spectrum in order to pursue such strategy.  
The main power source is the rejection on which the rector can build his/her decisions. This 
becomes clearer when looking at internal appointments or appointments which would not 
meet quality standards in terms of the most suitable candidate for a particular professorship. 
The fact that they have become unlikely is because of an active strategy and the possibility of 
interference at important stages of the selection process. For example, the rector only has to 
accept the list partly. This means he/she can only negotiate with candidate number one and 
two but not with candidate number three. This puts him/her into a powerful position e.g. if a 
special candidate is favoured or even not. This is an important counterbalance and a visible 
limitation of bottom power with regards to the final selection. (INT-7, INT-9) However, we 
have to insert a limitation of his/her power right here; this strategy can only function when 
senate and faculty cooperate i.e. being aware of relevant criteria (e.g. internationalisation, 
quality aspect) at their stages of influence since the actual power centre at a certain stage 
remains the appointment committee.  
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5.1.5 Informative power: control mechanisms 
The actors dealing with anti-discrimination issues ensure equal treatment and are informed 
after selection processes have been made. Their power emerges on basis of procedural errors 
mainly in terms of not having considered (or anticipated) non-discrimination issues. As a 
consequence, they only have limited rejecting power. The administrative actors are mainly 
concerned with the assessment of formal procedures and administrative support especially at 
the end of the appointment procedure. However, the influence especially of the UfQA should 
not be underestimated because the rector can get ‘valuable’ support from it. Because 
qualitative mechanisms get active at several later stages of the selection process (UfQA 
comments on invitation list/pre-selection list and appointment proposal) the rector receives 
information and better access to the committee’s work, and can come to a (different) 
conclusion on this basis. Hence, although this agency is neither a decision-making nor a 
rejecting power, it is an informative power which means that it reveals and opens the 
procedures.  
 
5.2 Formalisation and standardisation 
Formalisation: The extent of written and filed communications and procedures. Special 
attention has to be given concerning the source of formalisation (legal requirement vs. 
individual ideas). It is to assume that a more in autonomy and accountability leads to a more 
in formalisation: managerialism as a product of increased autonomy claims formalisation of 
internal communication and procedures. In addition, accountability (performance and result 
oriented) is dependent on formalisation in order to present measurements to third parties.  
Standardisation: Deals with making certain procedures (e.g. concerning decision-making, 
information procedure, implementation) repeatable after a given set of rules. Despite that, 
roles are dependant and related to these procedures (qualifications, performance, status, 
reward) and thus not based on personality characteristics.  
The reason why we combine formalisation and standardisation in this section is that they are 
correlated since standardised procedures need to be formalised before working properly. As a 
consequence it is easier to evaluate the recruitment process when discussing these two issues 
together since they relate to the same elements of interest that shall be examined here. 
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Concerning formalisation it is important to look at the extent of written and filed procedures 
at the recruitment process. In simplified terms, it is important to focus on what kind of 
information, to what purpose, and for whom. With Standardisation we want to evaluate a 
standardised dimension (occurrence, characteristics) of the recruitment process with the 
Professorial Appointment Procedure at the centre of discussion.  
 
5.2.1 Formalisation: strategy, accountability and transparency  
Long term planning or - in other words - development planning has become an important 
factor at the University of Vienna. Especially the current Development Plan 2015 is 
representative for a coherent university strategy. Since professorships play a special role 
within research and teaching, their role and appointment matters especially in terms of the 
research profile of the university. The chapters of the development plan about subject 
dedications at the different faculties attest this circumstance. They are the consequence of 
(long) preceded negotiations between different levels within the university (=> target 
agreements) e.g. about future profiles of (new) professorships. The accomplishment of own 
set goals becomes e.g. visible in the performance reports which are published annually since 
2010. 
If we take development plan and performance report exemplary, they stand for a university 
development which can be characterised by strategy and accountability. Textualisation in this 
respect is necessary for two reasons. First, it is relevant to document defined goals and future 
plans in order to refer to them at a later point if they have been achieved or not. Second, the 
distribution of resources is made conditional on their achievement (=> accountability). These 
two issues lead to a circumstance which coincidently is the precondition for successful 
accomplishment according to their measurement: transparency. In order to evaluate and adjust 
strategies and procedures it is necessary that these are unfolded. But the underlying rationale 
is actually much more trivial: in order to measure something, it first has to be made 
measurable. In other words, before evaluating procedures it is generally necessary to create 
them.  
If we look at the Professorial Appointment Procedure this becomes apparent by the official 
procedure document and the documentations that have to be made according to it. The stages 
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(I-VI) are outlined and the documentation on information at the different stages emphasised. 
Thereby several issues are concretised and to a certain extent regulated. One reason for this 
might be that information on the different stages and issues in the appointment procedures 
have to be forwarded to different actors and have to be comprehensible over extended periods 
of time.  However, the accuracy of information displays the quality of transparency and thus 
leads to an aspect which is in the centre of all the efforts: the quality of appointments. This 
quality can only be ensured if transparency and information flow exist, and therefore 
documentation is emphasised. The importance of quality and its formalisation becomes 
obvious by the statement of one respondent who points out that there were no incentives for 
quality under the old appointment polity. (INT-7)  
 
5.2.2 Standardisation: ensure quality 
The standardisation of the appointment procedure is necessary to ensure the quality aspect 
continuously and to guarantee iteration once an appropriate mechanism is found. The 
fundamental question in this respect must then be: how is quality defined?  As long as it 
concerns the recruitment process, the most apparent answer is internationalisation. This issue 
becomes clearer when relating it to the issue of internal or - from the quality perspective - 
unwanted appointments.  
International orientation as a determinant of quality seems to permeate the recruitment in 
many respects. With regards to a general benchmark and the structure of the appointment 
procedure, Zurich (with the University of Zurich) and Munich (LMU) are mentioned as role 
models. (Development Plan 2015: 13, INT-7) The underlying rationale seems reasonable: due 
to size, national importance, history and profile the comparison with other (research) 
universities has to go beyond Austria. Zurich and Munich both have universities of 
international reputation with similar (research) profile. In order to compete with them an 
international recruitment policy is crucial for the international profile and the reputation of the 
university.  
Of interest in this respect is the equation of internationalisation and quality. In order to receive 
the best persons for one discipline the candidate pool has to be broader than the own junior 
staff, unless they are exceptional better than other candidates. The reverse side of internal 
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appointments - from the perspective of the executive structure - are appointments which do 
not meet quality criteria. This applies to appointments which in former times usually defied 
control from other (superior) bodies.  In other words, appointment committees have been a 
“world of their own” (INT-6, own translation) where superior bodies accepted the decision 
without questioning them or without having the possibility to question them. If quality and 
transparency are perceived as two sides of the same coin, then these appointments were and 
are unwanted because their realisation has not been comprehensible. Since this practice 
usually applied to internal and local networks60, the scope of possible candidates had to go 
beyond these and their selection had to be according defined mechanisms that would assure 
quality. The gender aspect of candidates in this respect is just an intensifying factor.  
The mechanisms that assure quality are as follows: active search has to ensure that the ‘right’ 
candidates are to be found, and thus also candidates who have not applied actively are 
included.61 (see e.g. Development Plan 2015: 33) This is connected with the fact that 
announcements are now open/public and international. Another mechanism applies to the 
need of external and ‘independent’ assessors. They are perceived as ensuring objectivity and 
make (past) situations in the appointment procedures comprehensible. Administrative and 
legal actors are supportive and to a certain extent control agents so that relevant decision 
makers can make their decision on this basis. Their common aim is to ensure a balance 
between male and female candidates or quality in terms of an international search of 
candidates.  
However, even if standardised mechanisms support such an approach, this approach is also 
dependent on the relevant (decision-making) actors. In this respect it should be mentioned that 
it took - according to the interviews - some time until the senate appreciated its role as 
relevant control body; de jure the senate is the decision-maker of the appointment committee. 
However, 
“[r]ight after the implementation of the UG 2002, the senate decided not to intervene 
and to leave this task to the faculty to assemble the appointment committee which 
meant that old traditions were continued.” (INT-7, own translation)  
                                                 
60 Local networks with this regards applies to disciplinary connections/acquaintance within or beyond Austria; 
suggestions and decision making on candidates for professorships were often not comprehensible for higher 
approval bodies. One objective of recruitment practices was - as one candidate said - to limit the power of the 
‘academic oligarchy’. (INT-7) 
61 See stage ‘II Announcement and search’ of the Professorial Appointment Procedure. 
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Only recently, with the changes in the UG 2009, the senate seemed to appreciate increasingly 
its role as a  
“quality counterbalance in contrast to former practices: it proves proposals, quota, 
internal/external assessors, takes a broad representation of disciplines into account, 
involves competent scientists, and is cautious with regards to internal candidates.” 
(INT-11, own translation) 
 
5.3 Flexibility 
Flexibility: Describes the ability to change in terms of organisational structures and 
procedures. One special feature is related to the ability of absorbing environmental 
influences. The ability is measured according to vehemence and pace.  
Finally, how are the actors dealing with the professorial recruitment framework, e.g. how has 
the university but especially the department absorbed the influences from its environment 
especially with regards to (internal) university reforms? What are the outcomes/practices of a 
changed professorial recruitment? 
 
5.3.1 Absorption 
With regards to professorial recruitment and appointment procedure the university reforms 
seem to have limited impact on departmental influence. The university is still a bottom-heavy 
institution and this is especially true in our case with regards to the departmental possibilities 
of shaping the profile of their professorships as well as staffing the committees. An 
intensifying factor in this regard is apparently the respect and acceptance behaviour of the 
departments within the faculty and between the departments. There are traditional ways of 
handling certain issues, e.g. re-staffing professorships and dissolving positions as an 
exception. In addition, it has been confirmed that there are no tensions to a certain extent with 
the faculty or within the faculty. It seems to be common accepted practice not to intervene in 
other department matters: “[t]he changes look more severe in the law than in practice.” (INT-
8, own translation) 
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Another possible explanation why departmental influence in the appointment procedure is 
only limited to a certain extent seems to be the fact that changes occur at the level above, the 
level where final decisions are approved. Acceptance in this respect is ambivalent. On the one 
side it is accepted that there are traditional ways of ‘doing something’ and to leave things to a 
certain extent as they are. On the other side it is also acknowledged that new mechanisms 
(internationalisation, quality) in the recruitment process are needed in order to develop and to 
meet the challenges of a new zeitgeist. With regards to the recruitment process in general and 
the appointment procedure in particular one issue should serve as an example of how things 
can be balanced within the university: anticipation. The practice of having a broad 
composition (gender balance, including other subject-related areas, etc.) with regards to 
appointment committee and assessors is - as one respondent said - often anticipated and 
therefore at higher levels approved. This anticipation is eventually an acknowledgement of 
new practices, whereas the formal approval from higher authorities is an acknowledgment of 
the departmental room to manoeuvre.  
 
5.3.2 Confrontation 
The reverse side of flexibility is resistance. In other words, resistance dampens flexibility and 
is an expression of reluctance. Problems in terms of resistance and missing acceptance occur 
due to the outcomes of some new recruitment practices. Although this issue is very difficult to 
grasp it has been thematised constantly in the interviews: the special relation between Austria 
and Germany or the relation between locals and newcomers. Indeed, many members of the 
university are Germans and the number of members of international origins grows constantly. 
As we have found out, the traditional path of an academic career was to obtain hopefully a 
professorship at the own university. Every professor who came from abroad has limited this 
opportunity. Resentments have therefore mainly occurred at the level of non-professorial 
staff, and seem to permeate to a certain extent until the present day.  
However, due to the fact that internal appointments are de facto not possible, newcomers are 
per se not direct rivals of local non-professorial staff any longer but the outcome of an 
unwanted trend. This latter issue refers to a more general and social phenomenon. Former 
practices might be softened or changed with new generations of academics. But even if many 
traditional paths are perpetuated in academic life, the internationalisation and gender factor 
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will surely have an important impact on local structures. In simplified terms, there has been a 
traditional milieu characterised by mass education and local recruitment practices which 
continuously has to face international, meritocratic and more competitive shaped elements. 
The question of whether this cultural change is - like a respondent said - a “clash of cultures” 
(INT-11) or a merging of tradition and modernity will be dependent on the notion and the 
arguments of the particular members of the university.  
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6 CONCLUSIVE COMMENTS 
 
6.1 Starting point 
Our starting point in Chapter 1 was to look at reform impacts on university personnel policies. 
When it comes to the recruitment of professors, professional control played a substantial role. 
However, universities have been facing several reform attempts which have also targeted 
personnel policies. University reforms are transforming the organisational structure of the 
universities. Thus, in order to understand the reproduction logics of academic recruitment, 
one has to consider the institutional and organisational dimension of the university as well.  
Reasons for changes or the main drivers behind this are growing societal expectations towards 
the university. A solution was seen in a new university autonomy that would allow 
universities more room to manoeuvre while emphasising the need for accountability. In this 
respect, the institutional leadership and management (executive structure) of the university 
should get more strategic control over university matters like e.g. personnel policies.  
One question of interest was how this phenomenon would occur at Austrian universities. The 
university system in Austria was characterised by a strong academic oligarchy, a weak 
institutional leadership and a distant ministry. Several reforms in the recent decade have 
dissolved this relationship gradually. The reforms of the UOG 1975 took massification and 
participation rights of the non-professorial staff into account and transformed the university 
into a democratic university. In the following time ministerial distance and state bureaucracy 
were questioned increasingly. With the UOG 1993 different autonomy concepts and the 
influence of rector and dean became increasingly important, and laid the foundation for the 
UG 2002. The new institutional autonomy of the UG 2002 emphasised a strong institutional 
leadership, and the relation between state and accountability issues is regulated by 
performance agreements. How would these university reforms eventually impact personnel 
policies and professorial recruitment in the university? 
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6.2 Research question and answer 
Our research question was how practices of institutional autonomy are changing regarding the 
recruitment of professors, and we were concerned with the formal and informal changes of the 
recruitment process. The question of interest was, what would happen when new executive 
structure and academic oligarchy, rooted in discipline and displayed by the departmental 
level, meet in the professorial recruitment in the backdrop of a changing university 
framework. The initial assumption was that a strong executive structure would constrain 
departmental influence. On the other side it was also assumed that departmental influence is 
further important and that the executive structure is dependent on it. In order to satisfy our 
research interest, we have been focused on the professorial recruitment at the University of 
Vienna and the interaction between executive structure and departmental level, represented by 
the Department of Economic and Social History.  
Our findings have shown that the executive structure constrained departmental influence only 
to a certain extent but nevertheless with important outcomes. This applies especially when it 
comes to the final selection of candidates. An appointment procedure has been established 
where quality mechanisms interfere and where the executive structure can intervene if it 
comes to the conclusion that appointments would not meet quality criteria in terms of the best 
candidate. However, the executive structure and actors in the appointment procedure only 
have rejecting power. De facto, it is not possible for them to ‘craft’ the recruitment; the 
selection of candidates might constrain departmental influence but not the input that arises 
from it. The department wields its authority by sending important impulses in defining 
profiles and staffing decision making bodies like the appointment committee. This two-folded 
occurrence of change and continuity becomes apparent when looking at our categorisations: 
in order to classify the extent and ‘quality’ of change, we assessed professorial recruitment 
according to centralisation, formalisation and standardisation, and flexibility.  
Centralisation in the professorial recruitment exists in the sense that law provided rector/ate 
and senate with more power. Despite that, appointment procedures are not only accepted but 
increasingly reviewed from different actors and by different (quality) mechanisms. But, as a 
matter of fact, it seems to be more appropriate to refer to the recruitment process as a system 
of checks and balances.  In other words, the department keeps its influence from below. When 
it comes to the final selection though, this influence has to be seen in the light of a coherent 
university strategy which can interfere correctively according to a preferable outcome (e.g. 
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internationalisation, no internal/non-transparent appointments, transparency).  To put it 
simply, change in the recruitment process then occurs as follows: decisions from the 
department in former times were accepted unquestioned, now they are accepted after being 
questioned occasionally by the superior authorities.  
This becomes especially visible when looking at the conditions of why they are being 
questioned. As we have seen, the reasons behind formalisation and standardisation are that 
internal/non-transparent appointments are generally of ‘bad’ quality whereas international 
appointments are of ‘good’ quality. Executive structure and quality mechanisms can function 
as a filter which filters departmental input until a desired outcome stays over. (External) 
assessors, active (international) search, and international announcements are eventually 
instruments for one specific purpose: to support a strategy where the last consequence is to 
submit a fragmented development - carried by the particular interests of the departments - to a 
coherent university strategy. 
The department but also the university as such meet these new circumstances by anticipation. 
This anticipation has an ambivalent occurrence: the department accepts new power balances 
in decision making when it comes to a coherent university strategy. Superior authorities 
acknowledge the fact that traditional paths are to a certain extent continued. Damped 
flexibility refers more to the outcomes of a general and cultural change that the evolving 
recruitment modus produces. Since internationalisation and new definitions of quality lead to 
a changing composition of university staff, different perspectives and new practices are 
introduced which clash and/or merge with former traditions. However, when looking at 
vehemence and pace of university reform changes, it can be at least questioned if it was not 
more appropriate to classify them as evolutionary rather than revolutionary.  
 
6.3 Further research  
Since this was a case study at one department of a university it was possible to research 
professorial recruitment more in-depth. However, the advantage of such an approach could be 
more valuable if being compared to several cases or several departments respectively. In this 
regard, it will be of interest to see the results of the FLAGSHIP project and what their 
constant research reveals. 
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This approach could be either related to departments within one faculty or between several 
ones, as well as within one university or between several. In so doing, it could be possible to 
identify common disciplinary patterns when it comes to professorial recruitment. Since 
university reforms are an ongoing topic it could be also of scientific interest to see how other 
fields, like e.g. research and teaching policies on the departmental level and in the university 
would respond to reform changes. This would improve the understanding of university 
functioning in general, and provide valuable insight on the working floor of a university.  
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Appendix 
 
Interview guide (abstract, translation) 
 
Introduction 
Overview of thesis and research project 
Research: practices of institutional autonomy concerning professorial recruitment (from the 
perspective of the Department of Economic and Social History) 
Confidentiality issues 
Interview 
Main questions: Requesting more details when occurring: 
Personal information on interview partner  
• Development planning 
• Practices under new appointment 
laws § 98 and § 99 of the UG 
• Tradition vs. reform 
• Internationalisation 
• Gender quota 
• Internal appointments 
• Nepotism 
• Terna-list 
• Personnel policy 
Development planning and power balance with 
regards to professorial recruitment 
• Agenda, time schedule, funding 
Interpretation/possibilities of the 
faculty/institute/university/particular actor62 
within the recruitment process 
• Subject dedication/profile, appointment 
committee, etc. 
Power balance within professorial recruitment  
• Special focus: within the faculty and the 
department, room to manoeuvre between 
the departments, in interaction with other 
university groups/actors of in the 
recruitment 
Change 
• outcome/improvements/disadvantages of 
the current recruitment process 
 
Conclusion 
Additional information of respondent 
Information from interviewer, next steps of work 
 
                                                 
62 Dependant on particular actor/interview partner 
